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Abstract 
The majority of wheat research in the world and in Canada is conducted by the public sector. 
The government of Canada has introduced legislation to update its plant breeder’s rights (PBR) 
legislation, making Canada compliant with the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 91 convention, with the goal to stimulate private investment in wheat 
variety research. International experience with UPOV 91 reveals a wide range of outcomes 
depending on the specific royalty setting mechanisms allowed within their domestic legislation. 
This thesis compares Canada’s existing policy to three very different international examples 
(France, United Kingdom, and Australia) of UPOV 91 compliant royalty collection systems for 
wheat. The model presented is one of a monopolistic competitive wheat-breeding industry with 
the introduction of a new certified seed variety. Farmers have the option to use farm saved seed 
(FSS) or certified seed on their farm. The additional economic benefit created from the 
innovation and its distribution is analyzed and interpreted for both, farmers (social benefit) and 
breeders (private benefit). 
The results of the analysis show that while each UPOV 91 compliant model generates more 
revenue for farmers and breeders than Canada’s current policy, they tend to generate less than 
expected revenue in the short-run. If a country has strong intellectual property rights (IPRs), it 
will attract some domestic and foreign investment and possibly a beneficial collaboration 
between the public, private, and producer sector, also known as P4 (public-private-producer-
partnerships).  
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1 General Introduction 
Plant breeding is the single most important tool that delivers solutions to the challenges of 
food security, climate change and the more efficient use of resources as well as making a major 
contribution to economic growth (Alston et al., 1995). Plant breeding and research are essential 
to maintain pest resistance and to increase productivity at the farm level. However, breeding new 
crop varieties is a lengthy process requiring several years of substantial investment. Public 
breeding institutions generally have limited funding available for projects and have to allocate 
their resources accordingly. Private breeding companies only invest where they see a potential 
for profits or where they know they can at least recover their high investment costs. According to 
Alfranca (2005) profitability depends on a country’s contract enforcement regulations or patent 
property right protection. As an incentive to attract private investment to a country, newly 
developed plant varieties need to be protected through intellectual property rights (IPRs) if 
technical intellectual property (IP) protection is not possible (Lence and Hayes, 2008).  
Bill C-18 – A General Overview 
Currently Canada is a signatory of the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, known as UPOV, which was created in 1961 and updated in 1978 and again 
1991 to strengthen IPRs. An in-depth review of UPOV 78 and 91 is conducted in chapter 2. 
Today, most countries that are part of UPOV are signatories of UPOV 91. Canada signed UPOV 
91 in 1994 but has never passed UPOV 91 consistent legislation. In December 2013, the 
government of Canada introduced Bill C-18, also known as “The Agricultural Growth Act”. 
“Bill C-18 is designed to modernize and strengthen federal agriculture legislation, support 
innovation in the Canadian agriculture industry and enhance global market opportunities” (CFIA, 
2013).  
The main purpose for the revisions to the Plant Breeders Right (PBR) Act included in the 
Bill is to (1) encourage investment in plant breeding in Canada, (2) attract foreign varieties to 
Canada, (3) align the current statute with the UPOV 91 convention, and (4) allow farmers access 
to the best varieties available in any country that is party to UPOV 91. The Bill is particularly 
important for crops without technical IP protection or patent protection.  
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This thesis focuses on the implications of UPOV 91 protection for wheat, which is the 
largest crop in Canada without technical IP or patent protection. 
1.1 Background 
To better understand the importance of the Bill for the future of Canada’s wheat-breeding, it 
is important to understand Canada’s position on the global wheat market, who the major 
producers are, Canada’s current policy standing, and the importance of private investment in the 
country.  
World Wheat Market 
As of 2011, wheat was the largest food crop produced in the world and the most traded 
(FAOSTAT, 2011). As such, it plays an essential role in global food security. Today, most 
production increases are due to improved yield varieties, pesticides, fertilizers and the use of 
irrigation (University of Saskatchewan, 2012). Yield gains in many countries have, however, 
been leveling off during the past 25 years (Knight et al., 2012). Figure 1.1 shows the top 10 
wheat producing countries in the world in 2013: 
 
Figure 1.1: Top Ten Wheat Producing Countries in the World 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization FAOSTAT, 2013. 
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With about four percent of global production, Canada is one of the top ten wheat-producing 
countries in the world and is one of the largest exporters of wheat. As the largest crop grown in 
Canada, wheat remains important for the regional and national economy. More information on 
Canada’s wheat industry is given in chapter 7. The intensity of investment in wheat breeding and 
research has fallen behind corn, soybean, and canola, where hybrid and patent protection has 
attracted significant private breeding investment. As a non-hybrid and a non-genetically 
modified (GM) crop, wheat reproduction can only be protected with IP protection, such as 
stronger plant breeders’ rights (PBRs), which in Canada are lacking. Because proper IP 
protection is not available, private companies have limited ability recover investment costs, nor 
make a profit in the long run, which suggests the lack of private investment for wheat in Canada.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Wheat is the dominant grain of world commerce, is easily transported and stored (University 
of Saskatchewan, 2012). In 2011, 33 percent of the total crop area planted in Canada was wheat, 
making it the largest crop grown in the country. Canada is a world leader in the development, 
production and marketing of canola and other pulses, but is falling behind in wheat (ISF, 2011). 
Canada’s share of world wheat market is shrinking. One of the main reasons may be due to an 
underinvestment in wheat research (Gray and Veeman, 2009), and that may be due to the lack of 
plant variety protection (PVP) mechanism in place. Most new wheat varieties developed 
originate from the public sector, which is funded by the federal and provincial governments and 
through the Western Grains Research Foundation (WGRF), which is funded by producer levies. 
WGRF funds mainly projects with focus on yield increases and disease resistance, and other 
agronomic issues (AAFC, 2012). The Alberta Crop Industry Development Fund (ACIDF), and 
the Saskatchewan Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) also fund a significant amount of 
agronomic research (ACIDF, 2014; ADF, 2014). In this thesis the annual benefit distribution in 
each country considers only royalty investment, without the levy- and public investments.  
In Canada, only about two percent of wheat breeding and research is conducted by the 
private sector (ISF, 2011). The private sector is willing to invest in research if there is potential 
to recover research costs and make a profit. In North America, private investment is significant 
in crops where IP is protected through utility patents and hybrid technologies (Alston et. al., 
2012). The right to exclude others from using a new technology is very important to promote 
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private investment (Gray, 2011). The majority of countries part of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) passed UPOV 91 convention, except for 
Canada and eight other countries. Australia, EU, Russia, United States (US), and the Ukraine, 
Canada’s major wheat export competitors, are all part of UPOV 91 (Wood, 2013).  
It is also worth noting that moving toward stronger IPRs is not without some controversy. 
International corporations dominate the applications for PBRs and patents in developing 
countries. These corporations hold 97 percent of all patents and 90 percent of all technology and 
product patents. The large percentage of patent and product holdings provides them with a lot of 
power and control over the seed industry (Kuyek, 2001). 
Market Failure 
The reproduction of wheat occurs through open pollination. Once farmers plant a new seed 
variety with the improved technology, wheat reproduces and the farmer can save the seed.  In the 
absence of legal restrictions, farmers can benefit from the new genetics for years following the 
original purchase for free. The ability to reproduce a variety for free poses an issue for private 
companies that want to create a new wheat variety because the knowledge is embodied within 
the seed. A new variety is “non-excludable”, meaning that once a farmer sows the seed and 
harvests it, the farmer can use the knowledge in the future without paying for it. Non-
excludability leads to spillovers, where farmers receive a large portion of the benefit, while 
decreasing the breeders’ benefit (Alston et al. 2012). When private breeders cannot appropriate 
sufficient returns from their investment, it reduces the private incentive to invest money in 
breeding, which leads to market failure. IPRs can address the issue of excludability and market 
failures related to spillovers, which is the case in Australia, further discussed in chapter 6. Seed 
is also “non-rival”, such that if one farmer uses the variety, it does not exclude another farmer 
from using it as well. Non-rivalry creates economies of size, which can lead to market power 
issues in industries with strong property rights. 
This thesis does not conduct a social welfare analysis. It addresses the issue of 
underinvestment of private wheat-breeding firms. Public investment is excluded from this 
analysis. 
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As Canada contemplates how to design a system to implement UPOV 91 PBRs, 
international experience can provide valuable insights. Other countries, notably France, United 
Kingdom (UK), and Australia have used UPOV 91 PBRs to strengthen property rights and create 
a royalty stream to support additional research.  
This begs the questions of: (1) To what extent has the introduction of UPOV 91 PBRs 
affected the economic transfer of surpluses from breeders to farmers due to incomplete property 
rights and private investment incentives in these countries? (2) Which system is most efficient, 
considering farmer and breeder benefit distributions, in royalty generation and wheat breeding? 
(3) And, what can Canada learn from international experience?  
1.3 Objectives 
As Canada moves forward with the introduction of UPOV 91, I analyze the royalty 
collection systems of France, UK, and Australia, which are compliant with UPOV 91 but have 
implemented PBRs in different ways. These three systems are very different from each other and 
seem to be the three main options available for Canada moving forward. In this thesis, I examine 
the ability of these systems to create private incentives for research, discuss the strengths and the 
weaknesses of each, and identify what Canada could learn or adapt to from such a system. 
The specific objectives of this thesis are to:  
(1) Develop a greater understanding about the competitiveness of the wheat-breeding 
industry. How is the pricing of certified seed impacted by the existence of farm saved 
seed (FSS)?  
(2) Identify the incentives created by intellectual property rights (IPRs). Given the current 
royalty rates for FSS and certified seed within each country, calculate the benefit that 
breeders (private benefit) and farmers (social benefit) receive, which they are not paying 
for. This will address the question of: Of the total economic benefit created, do breeders 
get a large enough share of the benefit through the royalties to have enough incentive to 
keep researching and investing in the wheat-breeding industry? 
(3) Identify which of these three systems would best be adapted for Canada. 
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1.4 Methodology 
Two methods are used to analyze how the countries collect royalties and how the parties 
(breeders and farmers) are benefitting from the current royalty rates charged.  
First, I apply a six panel monopolistically competitive model to the wheat-breeding industry. 
This model aids in understanding how the FSS royalty impacts on what breeders charge for the 
certified seed royalty in each country.  
Secondly, I calculate the additional annual benefits for farmers and breeders created by the 
introduction of a new wheat variety. Given the current royalty rates, I calculate the transfer of 
surplus from breeders to farmers from the introduction of the new variety due to incomplete 
property rights. Calculating this surplus transfer provides an indication of the ability to address 
market failure and create optimal private incentives for research through royalty rates. 
1.4.1 Expected Results 
I expect the results gained for France, UK, and Australia show that UPOV 91 has created 
incentives for private breeding. Given that each country has some private breeding activity, each 
system is able to generate private surplus for the breeders. Given the strength of the Australian IP 
system managed through end point royalties (EPRs), this system may allow the breeders to 
capture a larger share of benefits as compared to other countries. If breeders can capture more of 
the benefit created from their own innovation through royalties, they will likely remain in the 
country to conduct future research and variety enhancement.  
1.5 Organization of Thesis 
In this thesis, I analyze the incentives created by IPRs and the funding mechanisms for 
wheat breeding in France, UK, and Australia and from this analysis I draw some possible 
implications for the public and private wheat breeding institutions in Canada after the adoption 
of UOPV 91. The analysis includes looking at royalty collection mechanisms in other countries 
and other funding methods for research and development (R&D) focused on wheat. I discuss the 
proposed IPRs outlined in UPOV 91 and explain how they have affected wheat research in other 
countries. I also analyze the additional annual benefits created for farmers and breeders through 
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wheat breeding and varietal improvement. Lessons and options for Canada’s future policy and 
practice are outlined.  
In chapter 2 I briefly describe the background of legal plant protection, including UPOV, the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and other 
mechanisms used by different governments. In chapter 3 I outline the theoretical framework for 
the thesis. In chapter 4 I describe the French wheat royalty system, institutions involved in 
breeding and royalty collection, as well as the additional annual benefits created for farmers and 
breeders found in the country. In Chapters 5 and 6, I describe the UK system and the Australian 
system respectively in the same way as done for France. In chapter 7 I briefly describe the 
current situation for the wheat-breeding industry in Canada. In chapter 8 I summarize and 
conclude the thesis and its findings. Lessons for the Canadian future wheat industry are outlined 
in section 8.1.   
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2 Background – Methods of Plant Protection  
Legal intellectual property rights (IPRs) and technical intellectual property (IP) protection 
mechanisms, such as hybrids, can exclude others from reproducing a new crop variety. These 
mechanisms allow the owners and breeders of a new variety to charge for their innovation. As 
such, for the crops that lack technical IP protection, the introduction of IPRs is necessary for the 
development of a private crop research industry. Most crops that are open pollinated can be 
reproduced at a low cost by saving and using seed from the previous harvest. The practice of 
saving seed is very common and is often referred to as farm saved seed (FSS). In the absence of 
adequate IPRs and in the presence of FSS, breeders often cannot recover their investment costs. 
It is important to note that the new technology needs to create benefits for farmers (lowering of 
prices) as well as for breeders (increase in supply) so that breeders keep innovating and farmers 
keep adopting new varieties. But as benefits transfer from breeders to farmers to a point where 
breeders do not receive enough remuneration, private breeders will stop innovation in a given 
country. 
Some countries have stronger IPRs than others, depending on the regulations implemented. 
Stronger IPRs enhance the ability to capture value, increasing the possibility of profits, therefore, 
private plant breeders will tend to locate and invest in those countries. Since most countries and 
intergovernmental organizations that offer a plant variety protection (PVP) system for open 
pollenated crops have chosen to base it on the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV) convention, I mainly focus on UPOV throughout this thesis. 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe the various international legal regimes governing IPRs in plant 
varieties. I structure the protection methods in four major sections; legal, contractual, technical, 
and social, and present them in the following way: 
Some countries use a legal (publically based) framework to protect the seed innovations 
created in their countries. The legal options include the UPOV convention, the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), patents, 1994 EU legislation, and 
utility patents. If a legal framework is not available, some breeders create a contractual (farmer-
breeder based) framework. The contractual framework includes contracts, bag labels, and 
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technology use agreements (TUA). Another option to the contractual framework is a technical 
(private based) framework. The varieties are protected using a technical mechanism. Methods 
included in this group are hybrids and Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTS). The last 
method of protection is trade secrets, one based on a social mechanism. Some of these methods 
mentioned can only be enforced if countries are part of TRIPS or UPOV, both which are 
discussed below. 
2.2 Legal (Public) Protection 
The legal framework includes the two large intergovernmental organizations such as the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) and the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), in addition to patents and utility 
patents. Plant variety protection (PVP) is the standard method of protecting innovative plant 
varieties in many countries. The UPOV provides the legal framework for the plant breeders’ 
rights (PBRs) in most countries. Member countries agree to the rules and regulations when they 
sign the convention (ISF, 2011). In addition to the UPOV, if the countries are also members of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) they have to comply with TRIPS (UPOV, 2012). Unlike 
patents, PBRs are automatically enforced in every country that is member of UPOV. 
2.2.1 International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 
The UPOV is an intergovernmental organization in which all countries have the opportunity 
to join. However, once a member of the organization, a country becomes bound to the UPOV 
convention that passed legislation. “The mission of the UPOV is to provide and promote an 
effective system of plant variety protection, with the aim of encouraging the development of new 
varieties of plants, for the benefit of society” (UPOV, 2014).  
The UPOV convention was drafted in 1961, revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991. The 
convention was set up to provide protection for plant breeders in their own and overseas markets. 
Figure 2.1 shows current UPOV member countries (green), countries that have initiated the 
procedure for acceding to the UPOV convention (brown), and countries in contact with UPOV 
for assistance in the development of laws based on the UPOV convention (orange). As of 2014, 
72 countries in total were parties of UPOV, 19 to the 1978 convention, 52 to the 1991 
convention and one to the 1961 convention (UPOV, 2014).  
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Figure 2.1: Members and Potential Future Members of UPOV 
Source: UPOV, 2014. 
The UPOV convention requires member countries to provide intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) specifically for plant varieties. The UPOV convention adopts a sui generis (adj. Latin for 
“one of a kind” or “unique”) system of protection especially tailored to the needs of plant 
breeders. This form of IPR is referred to as plant breeders’ right (PBR) (Nottenburg, 2012). 
Breeders in most countries use PBRs to protect their varieties as in most countries a plant variety 
per se (adj. Latin for “by itself”) is not patentable, but a trait within a variety may be patented 
(BSPB, 2011). As described in the UPOV convention, to qualify for a grant of PBR, a variety 
must be morphologically distinct, uniform and stable (DUS). “To satisfy the requirement of 
distinctness, a variety must be clearly distinguishable from any other variety whose existence is a 
matter of common knowledge” (UPOV, 2002 p. 13). According to Article 6 of the UPOV 1961 
and 1978 conventions, “a variety is deemed uniform if it is sufficiently homogeneous, having 
regard to the particular features of its sexual reproduction or vegetative propagation” (UPOV, 
2002 p. 13).  
Article 8 of the UPOV91 convention “deems that a variety is uniform if, subject to the 
variation that may be expected from the particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently 
uniform in its relevant characteristics” (UPOV, 2002, p. 19). In the UPOV 1961 and 1978 
conventions, a variety “must be stable in its essential characteristics, that is to say, it must remain 
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true to its description after repeated reproduction or propagation or, where the breeder has 
defined a particular cycle of reproduction or multiplication, at the end of each cycle” (UPOV, 
2002 p. 20). Similar in the UPOV 91 convention, “a variety shall be deemed to be stable if its 
relevant characteristics remain unchanged after repeated propagation, or in the case of a 
particular cycle of propagation, at the end of each cycle” (UPOV, 2002, p. 23). New in the 
UPOV 91 convention, a variety must also show “novelty” which is described in Article 6 as “the 
variety shall be deemed to be new, if at the date of filing of the application for a breeder’s right, 
propagating or harvested material of the variety has not been sold or otherwise disposed of to 
others, by or with the consent of the breeder, for purposes of exploitation of the variety” (UPOV, 
2009, p. 4). 
Countries either have an “automatic incorporation” of the UPOV convention or a 
“legislative incorporation”. The first just needs to implement legislation to authorize 
administrative agencies to process applications. In the latter, UPOV does not become enforceable 
by law until the country enacts a national plant variety protection (PVP) law that conforms to the 
convention’s requirements (Helfer, 2011, p. 21). Canada has a legislative incorporation and 
currently uses UPOV 78, but is in the process and could pass legislation for UPOV 91 (see: Bill 
C-18) as early as August 2014. 
2.2.1.1 UPOV 1978 
Plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) under UPOV 78 are less restrictive than under UPOV 91. 
Under the UPOV 78 convention, not all plant varieties need to be protected. The countries are 
obligated to protect five varieties on the date the convention enters into force and add at least 
another 19 within eight years. The convention also permits protection of plant varieties by either 
PBR or patents but not both (Helfer, 2011, p. 22). The convention does not require protection of 
harvested material. However, one needs to obtain permission from the breeder for production, 
sale or commercial marketing of the seed for the protected variety. The minimum term of 
protection is 15 years for wheat (Helfer, 2011, p. 23). The 1978 convention contains the 
breeders’ rights and the farmers’ privilege, which are explained in more detail below. 
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2.2.1.2 UPOV 91 
UPOV 91 poses stricter requirements as opposed to UPOV 78. The UPOV 91 convention 
requires member states to protect at least 15 plant species upon the signing of the convention and 
to extend protection to all plant varieties within ten years (Helfer, 2011, p. 26). The convention 
also contains a definition of “variety” as compared to UPOV 78 and also permits member states 
to protect the same plant variety with both PBRs and patents. Exclusive rights of UPOV 91 
extend not only to propagating material, but also to any harvested material that is grown from the 
unauthorized use of the propagating material. UPOV 91 extends the term of protection for wheat 
from 15 to 20 years (Helfer, 2011, p. 28). The breeders’ rights and farmers’ privilege are also 
contained in this convention (Helfer, 2011, p. 29). 
Farmers’ Privilege (Agricultural Exemption) 
An optional clause called farmers’ privilege is included in the UPOV convention, which 
grants farmers the right to save their harvest to use for propagating purposes on their farm 
without the breeders’ prior authorization (Art. 23). New in UPOV 91, the farmer, with the 
exception of small farmers, may have to pay the holder an equitable remuneration (Art. 23.1, 3) 
for the use of the protected variety. Farmers are, however, not allowed to sell the seed to third 
parties. The farmers’ privilege is also known under the term of “farm saved seed” (FSS). FSS 
can lead to issues and challenges within the system pertaining to the collection of royalties for 
breeders (ISF, 2011). Some nations only permit farmers to plant FSS to be used on their own 
land holdings, while others allow them not only to replant but also to sell limited quantities of 
seed for reproductive purposes, a practice often referred to as “brown bagging”. The convention 
also allows restricting breeders’ rights so that breeders must receive remuneration (Helfer, 2011, 
p. 23). This means that if a farmer purchases seed from a breeder, the breeder can make the 
farmer enter a license agreement that authorizes the farmer to reproduce seed only if they agree 
to pay a royalty on all products from the variety. In Australia, for example, the breeders have a 
claim for harvested material created from unauthorized use that enables the enforcement of bag 
licenses.  
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Breeders’ Rights 
The breeders’ rights is a mandatory clause and gives “breeders of protected varieties the 
right to authorize or refrain from authorizing other breeders seeking to use the protected variety 
to create new varieties or to market those varieties” (Helfer, p. 23, 2011). In addition, the 
following acts in respect of the propagating material of the protected variety shall require the 
authorization of the breeder for production or reproduction; conditioning for the purpose of 
propagation; offering for sale; selling or marketing; exporting; importing; and stocking for any of 
the purposes mentioned (UPOV, 2010). Some countries have introduced a “breeders’ 
exemption” allowing breeders to use the patented trait for research without the original breeders’ 
permission. However, new varieties cannot contain the previously patented trait unless the patent 
holder grants a license to do so (ISF, 2011). 
The breeders’ rights in the UPOV 91 convention are expanded to the following restrictions: 
(1) production and reproduction for propagation, exporting, importing, and stocking of 
propagating material of a variety, (2) rights extend to essentially derived varieties (EDV) which 
are predominantly derived from the protected variety (retains all essential characteristics except 
differences arising from derivation), (3) rights extend to harvested materials obtained through 
unauthorized use of propagating material, where the breeder had no reasonable opportunity to 
exercise rights, (4) duration of the protection is expanded from 15 to 20 years for wheat, (5) 
currently, no prior sales are allowed in Canada before applying for PBR protection, however, 
with the new convention, sales are allowed up to one year prior to application, (6) applicants 
receive an automatic provisional protection from the date the application was accepted for filing. 
The breeders’ rights have the following restrictions: 
(1) Breeders’ exemption (compulsory): No authorization required to breed from a PBR 
protected variety. 
(2) Research exemption (compulsory): No authorization required to conduct research and 
experimentation on a PBR protected variety. 
(3) Private exemption (compulsory): No authorization required for private/non-commercial 
acts (e.g. gardeners) (Parker, p. 34, 2014).  
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2.2.1.3 Proposed UPOV 91 Amendments to Canada’s PBR Act (Bill C-18) 
To understand the arguments made in this thesis, it is important to understand the major 
proposed changes to the underlying amendments (Parker, 2014). The purpose of the Agricultural 
Growth Act (Bill C-18) is to bring Canada in conformity with UPOV 91.  
Table 2.1 shows the major changes occurring with the adoption of UPOV 91.  
Table 2.1: Changes Occurring by Updating to UPOV 91 
UPOV 78 
Canada’s Legislation Complies 
UPOV 91 
Canada’s Legislation Does Not Comply 
Article 4 – Eligibility Criteria 
Sales of the new variety are allowed once 
the IPR has been approved 
Allows sales up to a year prior to the IPR 
approval 
Article 5 – Scope of the Breeders’ Right – Stronger Protection 
• Needs breeders prior authorization 
for: 
• Production for commercial 
marketing 
• Offering for sale 
• Marketing 
Of the reproductive material 
• Material can be used in research 
trials 
• Expands to purposes of 
propagation, importing, stocking 
and exporting 
• Extends the right to harvested 
material, if the breeder has not had 
the opportunity to exercise his right 
(e.g. royalty) 
• Extends to Essentially Derived 
Varieties (EDV)1 
Article 5.1 - Liability  
In an unauthorized sale, only the seller is 
liable for breach of contract 
If an infringement occurs, both parties 
(seller and buyer) are liable. 
Article 5.3 – Restriction to Breeders’ Rights and Farmers Privilege 
Canada does not prevent the use of 
protected material to develop new varieties 
 
 
There is no provision for an exception to 
the right to allow the farmer to save the 
harvested material from a protected variety 
New, the breeders exemption, research 
exemption, and private exemption are all 
compulsory, which strengthen breeders 
rights 
Includes an optional clause to allow 
farmers to save and use FSS on their own 
farms. 
Article 6 – Duration for Protection  
Protection is 18 years for all species in 
Canada  
Extends minimum protection period to 20 
years for most species; 25 years for vines, 
fruits and trees. 
Source: Parker 2014; UPOV, 2010. 
                                                
1 EDV - Where it can be proven that a new variety has been derived from an initial variety that is 
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While the Bill has a clear provision for FSS, the amendments to Articles 5 and 5.1 make it 
far easier for a breeder to enforce any bag license which they can use upon the sale of seed to 
oblige the farmer to pay a royalty on the use of FSS or on the sale of their product in the form of 
an end point royalty (EPR). 
2.2.1.4 1994 EU legislation 
Most European countries are part of the UPOV convention to protect their plant varieties. To 
harmonize the countries and to facilitate IP protection within the EU, the Community Plant 
Variety Right (CPVR) acquis (adj. French for “that which was agreed upon” or “of the 
community”) was created in 1994 based on the UPOV 91 principles (Jolly, 2012). CPVR allows 
IP protection for the breeder throughout the whole territory of the EU via one title through one 
application. A holder of a variety protected through UPOV can extend the protection and apply 
for a CPVR protection within the EU. To be granted CPVR the variety has to fulfill the DUS 
requirements according to Article 10 of the basic UPOV convention. One percent of all EPVR 
applications originate from non-EU applicants (CPVO, 2013). 
2.2.2 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was a part 
of a global package deal, which was administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1994 during the Uruguay Round. It establishes universal, minimum standards of protection that 
countries must provide for intellectual property (IP) (such as patents, copyright, trademarks, and 
trade secrets) (Helfer, 2011, p. 33). TRIPS imposes a minimum of 20 years of protection from 
the date of patent filing (Helfer, 2011, p. 50). The agreement states that countries must “provide 
for the protection of plant varieties by either patents or by an effective sui generis system or by 
any combination thereof” (Helfer, 2011, p. 50). The term sui generis is very vague and it is 
generally believed that it means each member country can design their own system of protection 
for plant varieties (Nottenburg, 2012). TRIPS requires WTO members to adopt ‘effective’ 
provisions into their national law to permit the enforcement of IP owners’ rights (Helfer, 2011, p. 
34). TRIPS does not mention anything about the UPOV convention, however, it has stronger 
legal protection for plant varieties than any other international agreement (Helfer, 2011, p. 33), 
because the provisions of TRIPS are more detailed and narrow than the compulsory licenses 
under UPOV 78 and 91 conventions. 
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“If WTO members choose to protect plant varieties using a sui generis right as opposed to a 
patent, they are required to create a distinct IPR applicable to plant varieties that complies with 
the core requirements and objectives of the TRIPS Agreement” (Helfer, 2011, p. 54). Under 
TRIPS, each country has to implement certain mechanisms to protect domestic and foreign 
varieties. However, local variations of these regulations are possible (Nottenburg, 2012). 
National governments have a wider variety of options in choosing IPR applicable to plant 
varieties (Helfer, 2011, p. 21). As of March 2013, there were 159 member states complying with 
TRIPs through the WTO (WTO, 2014). 
Correa (2000, p. 76) argues that there were four major drivers for the implementation of the 
TRIPS agreement. First, the growing importance of technologies underlying international 
competition; second, the difficulty of maintaining exclusive knowledge of such technologies; 
third, reductions in protectionist legislations, facilitating exports without the need of exploiting 
inventions locally; and finally the falling competitiveness of the United States (US) towards 
Asian countries, due to piracy and counterfeiting (Correa, 2000).  
Countries that are part of the WTO have to comply with TRIPS. Some countries are part of 
UPOV and other countries are part of both agreements. Being part of both agreements, 
governments are restricted in national law making, as they have to strictly comply with UPOV 
and TRIPS at the same time. The UPOV was introduced in 1961 and revised it in 1972, 1978 and 
1991. Each convention has slight different regulations. Most countries today are part of UPOV 
91. “Both, the UPOV 1991 convention and the 1978 convention adopted the principle of national 
treatment, the same principle required by TRIPS. However, under UPOV, such treatment need 
be extended only to the nationals and residents of other UPOV member states and to legal 
persons having their headquarters in such states” (Helfer, 2011, p. 55). The discretion that 
governments have to shape their PVP depends on the international agreements to which they are 
parties. There are five groups countries fall into, which are (Helfer, 2011, p. 60): 
(1) WTO only: These countries have a greater flexibility in policy making than countries 
belonging to UPOV alone and 95 of 147 WTO members belong to this category (Helfer, 
2011, p. 69).  
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(2) Either the UPOV 91 convention or the UPOV 78 convention only: only Russia and 
Ukraine are part of this category (Helfer, 2011, p. 68). 
(3) WTO and the UPOV 78 convention: There are 23 countries belonging to this category, 
including Canada. These countries enjoy a greater discretion due to a more limited 
protection of PBR contained in this earlier UPOV convention (Helfer, 2011, p. 68).2 
(4) WTO and UPOV 91 convention: These countries have the least discretion and this 
situation applies to 28 countries, including Australia, UK, France, and the United States. 
These countries must extend their protection to all plant varieties, comply with the 
TRIPS most favorite nation (MFN) treatment obligation and adopt the effective 
enforcement measures. In addition these countries have to comply with all of the other 
provisions of the UPOV 91 convention (Helfer, 2011, p. 66). For example, because the 
United States offers patents for plant varieties, it does not need to provide a sui generis 
system as required by the UPOV (Nottenburg, 2012). However, the United States has a 
second method to patent new plant varieties, which is known as the Plant Variety 
Protection Act (PVPA). This Act makes patent protection available to new varieties of 
asexually reproduced plants. The disadvantage, however, is that only one patent option 
can be chosen to protect a plant variety in each application (Blakeney, 2012). 
 (5) No IPR agreement relating to the protection of plant varieties: Countries falling into 
this category have no obligation to protect plant varieties or breeders’ rights in any 
form. Countries with a large agricultural sector or plant breeding industry are likely to 
benefit if their government has a robust IPRs with an array of exclusive rights and few 
limitations in place. On the other hand, small-scale farming member states will likely 
prefer weak IPRs with a broad farmers’ privilege (Helfer, 2011, p. 77).   
2.2.2.1 Benefits of TRIPS Agreement 
The following benefits are associated with the TRIPS agreement (Helfer, 2011, p. 39):  
(1) It links to other international trade agreements. 
(2) It is adhered widely by both the industrialized and the developing world. 
(3) It has novel enforcement, review and dispute settlement provisions. 
                                                
2 In 2012 France upgraded from UPOV 78 to UPOV 91.  
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(4) A review of Article 27.3 b., which states that the members of the WTO are allowed to 
protect their plant varieties by either a patent law, an effective sui generis system or a 
combination thereof (Helfer, 2011, p. 33). 
2.2.3 Utility Patents and Plant Patents 
In most countries, plant varieties are not patentable. Some countries such as Australia, US 
and Europe, will allow patenting a trait that is characterized by a single novel gene, invention or 
transgenic event (ISF, 2011). The variety carrying the trait can then, additionally, be protected by 
PBRs. In Canada, while plants per se are not patentable, plants that contain an innovation at a 
sub cellular level are patentable. For instance, transgenic canola varieties that contain the Round-
Up Ready gene3 are patentable, whereas, all non-transgenic wheat varieties are not patentable. 
When plants are not patentable, countries require an alternative mechanism to protect IP. The 
downside to patents is that the patent holder needs to apply for protection in each different 
country he wishes to have protection. 
In the US, any living organism (product of human intervention) can be patented using utility 
patents. Utility patent holders have the exclusive right to exploit the trait or to license to third 
parties. The holder can also exclude all others from using or selling the trait (Blakeney, 2012). 
The term “utility patent” is used to distinguish between patents and other forms of IP claims. 
Utility patents in the US are comparable to the standard patents granted in Australia and Europe. 
Utility patents can be used to claim exclusionary rights in many areas including new variety of 
plants, transgenic plants, plant groups, individual plants and their descendants, particular plant 
traits, plant parts, and plant breeding methodologies. In addition, the utility patent grants the 
owner the right to exclude others from making, using, selling and importing the invention for 20 
years (Nottenburg, 2012).  
In Europe on the other hand, the European Patent Convention (EPC) considers the UPOV 
and specifically excludes the patenting of “plant or animal varieties” in addition to the biological 
processes for the production of these varieties. However, if the process of sexual crossing 
                                                
3 The Round-Up Ready gene allows canola to be resistant to the herbicide Round-Up, introduced 
by Monsanto. 
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includes a step that introduces a trait into the genome or modifies the trait in the genome of the 
plant produced, it will not be excluded from the patentability (Blakeney, 2012). 
2.3 Contractual (Farmer-Breeder) Protection 
Contracts, bag labels, and Technology Use Agreements (TUA) are also used in some 
countries to protect IPs in plants. These methods of protection are not used as often as PBRs but 
are shortly explained to provide a more complete understanding. 
2.3.1 Contracts 
Contracts are used to support PVP. Contracts can, for example, force growers to comply 
with specific terms set by the breeders. There are only very few international agreements that 
regulate the law of contracts. Many seed companies will, for example, require producers to sign a 
contract agreeing not to reseed the second-generation crops. Contracts also capture downstream 
value by the sale of certified seed (ISF, 2011). Examples of contracts include bag labels, and 
TUAs: 
Bag Labels  
Bag label contracts are a way to legally protect plants and seeds in which the purchaser 
agrees to comply with the contract by opening a bag of seed (Nottenburg, 2012).  
Technology Use Agreements (TUA) 
TUAs are contracts between technology suppliers and farmers who control the right to plant 
the seed on a specified area of land for a certain period of time. The seed suppliers reserve the 
right to inspect the field and to take samples to ensure the compliance of the farmer. The misuse 
will lead to a breach of contract (Nottenburg, 2012).  
As noted above, under UPOV 78 PBRs, breeders have little recourse if a producer who signs 
a contract or a bag license, violates contract provisions, making these contracts very difficult to 
enforce. When protected by patents or UPOV 91 PBRs, unauthorized users of protected seed can 
be held liable for the breached contract term, which greatly enhances enforceability.  
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2.4 Technical (Private) Protection 
Hybrids and Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) are technical mechanisms to 
protect plant. Hybridization is one of the safest methods of protecting PBRs for the breeder. 
Through hybridization a producer can grow the first generation seeds; the second generation, 
however, will be almost infertile, making it infeasible for farmers to reseed the harvested seed. 
This means that it is necessary for producers to buy the certified seed every year so royalties for 
breeders are guaranteed (ISF, 2011). The cost of hybridization differs substantially by crop. In 
corn, and canola hybridization is relatively inexpensive and when combined with hybrid vigor is 
very economic for breeders. In contrast, despite decades of research economically viable hybrid 
wheat systems have not become widespread. However, the breeder has no enforceable remedy 
available, except under trade secret law or by contractual agreements (Nottenburg, 2012). Wheat, 
however, is a non-hybrid and non-genetically modified (GM) crop and, therefore, must rely on 
PBRs for protection. 
2.4.1 Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) 
The GURTs allows the control of gene expression of an organism, further allowing 
constraints or restrictions on the use of the organism or trait (Nottenburg, 2012). This is used to 
strengthen the protection of newly developed plant varieties, which could last for a longer period 
of time than patents. Variety-level Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (V-GURTs) are used to 
make the second generation of a crop sterile (also known as terminator gene). This exerts large 
effects on IPRs.  
There are three V-GURT strategies: First, the disrupter gene that blocks the embryo 
formation as mentioned above. The second strategy uses a chemical to turn off the disrupter 
gene. If this chemical were unavailable, the gene would express itself after one generation. The 
third strategy (similar to the second) uses a chemical activator that suppresses the gene that 
blocks growth (Lence et al., 2005). 
2.5 Social Protection 
The last category is a protection mechanism that has no legal or contractual background. An 
example for this that is still widely used in the breeding industry is trade secrets.  
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2.5.1 Trade Secrets 
A trade secret is defined as: “any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information that 
is used in a business and gives that business an opportunity to obtain advantages over 
competitors” (Nottenburg, 2012, section 3). The benefit of using trade secrets to protect new 
inventions is the unlimited time for protection. Plants can be protected provided that reasonable 
efforts have been made to keep the plant variety confidential and out of the public domain 
(Nottenburg, 2012). For instance, a close loop supply-chain may allow the specialized variety to 
be grown for the delivery to a specific processor. However, once the plant or particularly the 
plant seed is sold to the public other means of IPRs are required. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusion 
 Figure 2.2 summarizes the four different protection methods presented above.
 
Figure 2.2: IP Protection Summary 
Source: author. 
Given the many possible ways to enforce property rights, PBRs through UPOV seems to be 
the preferred method of protection for wheat in many countries. It allows plant breeders to 
protect a variety in one country and automatically extend protection to all other member 
countries without having to file for protection in each country. For wheat, France, UK, and 
Australia have all implemented UPOV 91 in different ways. The following chapters help to 
understand how the availability of farm saved seed (FSS) affects the ability of breeders to earn 
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rents from the sale of their new varieties given different implementations of PBRs outlined in 
this chapter. Each country presented has developed a unique system and has adopted certain 
exemptions and restrictions in addition to their PBRs regulations. Which PBRs system could 
improve the Canadian wheat-breeding industry? 	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3 Theoretical Framework 
Social and private benefits vary among different industry structures. In perfect competition, 
for example, the social benefit, i.e. consumer and producer surplus, is maximized. As 
competition decreases within a vertical market structure, the producer surplus increases at the 
cost of the buyers benefit. In this specific case, wheat seed buyers include farmers and 
downstream consumers of the final product.   
3.1 Introduction 
The first purpose of this chapter is to create a theoretical framework to help understand how 
the availability of farm saved seed (FSS) affects the ability of breeders to earn rents from the sale 
of their new varieties given different plant breeder rights (PBRs).  
The second purpose of this chapter is to calculate the average additional annual benefits 
created through innovation for farmers and breeders. In chapters 4, 5, and 6, the additional 
annual benefits created in each country are calculated using current royalty rates and increase in 
production-yield for France, United Kingdom (UK), and Australia respectively. Knowing the 
additional benefit created, the proportion of the benefit going to farmers and the proportion 
breeders capture is calculated, which, has implications for private research incentives. With 
private research and development (R&D), there is often a trade-off between incentives to invest 
(via reduced competition), which reduces costs and price distortions by raising prices. 
3.2 Background 
Once knowledge or a new plant variety is protected through intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), it becomes a “toll good”, which is non-rival but excludable (Fulton, 1997). Because 
wheat-breeding firms have large fixed costs, these firms have economics of size and scale, 
creating conditions for a less competitive market. In a pure monopoly, price is set where 
marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC). Fulton (1997) points out that because MC is 
always below average costs (AC), some market power must exist in the industry to cover AC.4 
                                                
4 Because price is above MC, some deadweight loss (DWL) arises. The extent of market power 
determines the size of DWL. A monopoly is least desirable, considering market power and the 
resulting high prices for new wheat varieties. On the other hand, a more competitive industry 
would reduce seed prices, which increases adoption, but through duplication of effort also 
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The extent of the market power depends on each country, its legislation, and number of wheat 
breeding firms. In France, for example, wheat-breeding firms are quite competitive, whereas, in 
the UK wheat breeding firms have more market power. 
The royalty rates charged in the wheat-breeding industry are heavily influenced by the 
market structure, IPRs, and by the nature of the competition in the industry. I argue that the 
wheat-breeding industry closely follows the model of a monopolistic competition. The 
monopolistically competitive model and its underlying assumptions are outlined in section 3.3 
and the following sub-sections support my argument.  
3.3 Monopolistic Competition  
The toll-good industry structure, the distinctness of wheat varieties and substitutability of 
certified and FSS lead to the model of a monopolistically competitive industry. The assumptions 
for a monopolistic competitive model are (Church and Ware, 2000; Chamberlain, 1933):  
(1) The availability of a large set of differentiated products; consumers (farmers) perceive 
there are non-price differences among the different products.  
(2) Even though products are differentiated, they are still close substitutes for each other. 
(3) Free-entry condition; there are no major barriers of entry and exit in the market for 
wheat breeding. The factors of production are assumed to be perfectly mobile and are 
used where they are most efficient. The free-entry condition leads to point four where 
price equals average total cost (P=ATC), which limits profits.  
(4) All firms aim for profit maximization (MR=MC, then P=ATC), which is their sole 
objective. Consumers (farmers) aim to maximize their welfare through their purchase. 
(5) There are many producers and many consumers (farmers) in the market, similar to 
perfect competition; while the numbers are not infinite, the market is still very 
competitive. 
                                                                                                                                                       
increases the cost of research (Alston et al. 2012). The non-rival aspect of intellectual property 
(IP) has reduced market competition of the seed industry (Fulton and Gray, 2007), which rules 
out perfect competition for the wheat-breeding industry. 
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(6) Firms are largely price takers but have a small amount of control over the price they 
charge. Each firm has their own demand curve, which is relatively elastic but still 
downward sloping.  
(7) Knowledge is widely spread between producers (breeders) and consumers (farmers), but 
is unlikely perfect. 
These seven characteristics can be found in the wheat-breeding industry, so the monopolistic 
competitive model can be used to describe the wheat-breeding industry in countries compliant 
with UPOV 91. More information on how these characteristics apply to the wheat-breeding 
industry is given in the following subsections: 
3.3.1 Distinctness (Differentiated Products) 
Given the requirement for distinctness stated by the International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), registered varieties are differentiated by legal requirement. 
Given that different breeders produce different varieties (see chapter 2), the market structure is 
consistent the monopolistically competitive model. New varieties differ in many agronomic traits 
(e.g. disease and lodging resistance, days to maturity, protein content, and many more) and in 
cost and revenue outcomes depending on specific farm and environmental characteristics of each 
farmer. As a result, each variety has a downward sloping demand giving the breeder some ability 
to price above MC. Whenever there is a price setting ability as in a monopoly or with 
differentiated goods, such as in monopolistic competition, companies price at MR=MC. Figure 
3.1 shows all the wheat varieties available for farmers for 2014 in Canada and their 
characteristics (Government of Saskatchewan, 2014). Figure 3.1 is an example of all the 
imperfect substitutes available on the market that a wheat breeder needs to consider before 
introducing a new certified seed wheat variety. 
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Figure 3.1: Wheat Varieties for Western Canada, 2014 
Source: Government of Saskatchewan, 2014. 
3.3.2 Substitutes 
The different varieties of (Canada Western Red Spring) CWRS wheat available to farmers, 
shown in Figure 3.1, are all somewhat substitutable with each other. Farmers will switch variety 
depending on the characteristics they are looking for and depending on royalties charged by the 
breeders. If a variety would suddenly double in price, farmers would have many other varieties 
they could switch to.  
The demand facing the breeder of the new variety is very dependent not only on the quality 
of the innovation, but also the availability of substitutes in the market place. As the owner of 
distinct variety, each breeder faces a downward sloping demand curve but the demand curve or 
the willingness to pay shifts lower as substitutes become more available. The demand curve may 
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even have a zero price intercept if other superior varieties are freely available. The downward 
sloping demand curve facing each breeder reflects the monopolistically competitiveness of the 
product. This demand curve is shown in the top right hand panel of Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3, and 
Figure 3.4.  
3.3.3 Free Entry 
Some countries have a privatized wheat-breeding industry (e.g. UK), some are public (e.g. 
Canada) and others are a mix of public and private firms (e.g. France). In each of these 
industries, there are low barriers to entry as different breeders produce different wheat varieties. 
There is a changing demand by farmers for new wheat varieties with different characteristics, so 
there is potential for new breeders to meet that certain demand. The PBRs outlined in UPOV 91 
allow breeders to use existing varieties to breed new varieties through the breeders’ exemption. 
This exemption encourages market entry and innovation.5 
3.3.4 Numerous Producers (Breeders) and Consumers (Farmers) 
There are 193 registered spring wheat varieties, 130 winter wheat varieties and 25 durum 
varieties in Canada (CFIA, 2014), and 60,749 wheat farmers (AAFC, 2010). Even though many 
wheat varieties are available, only a few public institutions are involved in the wheat-breeding 
sector in Canada. Given these statistics, it is apparent that there are many differentiated wheat 
varieties produced (by very few institutions) and many farmers on the market that want to 
purchase wheat. As opposed to a perfectly competitive market, this market is less competitive.  
3.3.5 Price Takers 
In some markets, wheat breeders are restricted on how much they can charge for royalties. 
There is enough competition by the other wheat breeders and by the presence of FSS a year later, 
such that royalties cannot be set too high. In addition, in some countries, governments or 
breeders’ and farmers’ unions can set royalty rates exogenously (e.g. France and UK). In other 
markets wheat breeders have more control over royalty rates settings, but still need to consider 
other breeders and crops on the market. 
                                                
5 Even though there are no legal barriers to entry, new breeding companies still face barriers to 
entry due to the high fixed costs (FC) of entering a market and strict licensing terms for variety 
registration.  
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3.3.6 Knowledge 
Knowledge is assumed to be widely available, such that wheat breeders know what 
characteristics their varieties have compared to competitors products. Wheat breeders also know 
what competitors charge for royalties. Farmers are also informed through public testing and 
variety guides, publications or other sources which varieties are available, their characteristics 
and the prices for each. An example of such information is given in Figure 3.1. 
3.3.7 Summary 
In a monopolistic competitive market, firms have more market power than in perfect 
competition but less than in a monopoly case. How much market power there is depends on the 
country, their legislation, and their number of wheat breeders. In the following chapters, each 
country is analyzed individually. Given the distinctness of products and the ability to set prices 
on their own demand curve, firms face an industry that has more market power than perfect 
competition.  
Including Farm Saved Seed (FSS) to the Model of Monopolistic Competition  
With UPOV 91 plant breeders’ rights (PBRs), farmers have access to farm saved seed (FSS). 
Because of the stability requirement for variety registration, FSS is genetically a virtually perfect 
substitute to certified seed of the same variety. By adopting a new variety, the farmer either 
purchases enough certified seed for the whole farm or purchases a small quantity of certified 
seed to produce enough FSS for the next year. Because wheat is open pollenated, once tested, 
cleaned, and treated, it allows farmers to reuse FSS for many years. 
By choosing to purchase only a small quantity of certified seed and growing their own FSS, 
farmers must forego the benefits of the new variety for one year as they grow seed. The existence 
of this perfect substitute and the relative pricing of certified and FSS royalties can provide some 
insight into the competitive structure of the industry. In particular, how the royalty structure for 
FSS influences the royalties charged for certified seed and the overall royalty income of 
breeders.  
As a general rule, the breeder does not determine the royalty charged on FSS. In most 
countries (e.g. Canada, U.S.A), there is zero a royalty on FSS. In France and the UK, FSS 
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royalties are exogenously set either through the government or by breeders’ and farmers’ unions, 
whereas, breeders freely set the royalties on certified seed in the UK. The exception to this 
general rule exists in Australia, where the breeder sets a common End Point Royalty (EPR) that 
applies equally to production from FSS and certified seed. The relationship between FFS and 
certified seed pricing is shown graphically in the next section. 
3.4 Graphical Analysis – Monopolistic Competition with FSS 
Consider the breeding and sale of a new crop variety. Assume the breeder has invested the 
necessary resources to develop a new variety and has registered this variety using PBRs. If 
granted PBRs, the breeder has the exclusive right to sell the seed of the variety for a specified 
amount of time (20 years for wheat), which enables it to charge a royalty.  
Assume also that the following conditions hold: 
(1) All farmers have the same portfolio of land characteristics. The greater is the land area 
planted; the lesser is the marginal productivity on this land. 
(2) Farmers differ in their marginal cost (MC) of producing FSS. The costs of acquiring 
certified seed to save and store as FSS, FSS preparation costs (storage, transportation, 
seeding, harvesting) for growing FSS are included as opportunity costs. Because the MC 
curve is different for each farmer, it is upward sloping. This also implies that the farmer 
that produces FSS the cheapest, likely uses FSS only. Other farmers, to whom the 
reproduction of FSS is the greatest, likely grow certified seed only. 
There are two different ways in which FSS and certified seed royalties are charged. 
Subsection 3.4.1 shows what happens when certified seed and FSS have a different royalty (e.g. 
France and UK), whereas, subsection 3.4.2 shows what happens when certified seed and FSS 
have the same royalty (e.g. Australia). It is important to note that different property rights lead to 
modifications of the model.  
3.4.1 Incomplete Property Rights – Different Royalties for Certified and FSS 
Figure 3.2 shows how the exogenously set FSS royalties impact what a breeder can charge 
for certified seed. This figure represents an individual firm in the total wheat-breeding market 
and can be applied to the UK and French wheat-breeding industry.  
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The farmer has a downward sloping demand curve because he can choose between different 
varieties. His demand depends on prices and availability of other varieties on the market. Once 
he chooses a variety (i), he has the choice between purchasing certified seed or/and using FSS of 
this same variety (i). If they choose certified seed, he must purchase the seed from a certified 
seed grower. Because the FSS royalty usually is lower than the certified seed royalty, some 
farmers may wish to use their own FSS. To do so they must purchase a small quantity of 
certified seed and incur the costs to grow it on their farm, test it, clean it, treat it for use, plus pay 
any FSS royalty due. With the latter option, the farmer must forego the additional rents earned 
from the variety (i) for one year while he grows FSS. 
Bottom right hand panel: 
This panel shows the FSS royalty which is exogenously set by the farmers’ and breeders’ 
unions (in France) or predetermined and based on historical royalty rates (in the UK). 
Middle right hand panel: 
The total marginal cost (TMC) of producing FSS is the vertical sum of the opportunity cost 
mentioned above plus the MC of producing FSS (MCFSS). The MC includes the cost of growing 
the FSS, seed testing, seed cleaning and treatment, and the opportunity cost is the forgone yield 
gain for one year. Once incurring these additional costs, farmers have access to the variety (i). 
The MCFSS curve is upward sloping as different farmers have different costs of producing FSS 
and are ordered from those with the lowest to highest MC of producing FSS. Producing FSS 
might be quite cheap for a large farmer but can be expensive (i.e. due to cleaning and storage 
costs) for smaller farmers. This increasing MCFSS curve helps differentiate the farmers in the 
model. 
Upper right hand panel: 
This panel shows the total demand curve for the variety (i) equals to the value marginal 
product (VMP). This VMP reflects the additional revenue variety (i) generates on each parcel of 
land. The total farmer demand for variety (i) is the sum of the demand for FSS and certified seed 
for variety (i). The demand curve shows the maximum price farmers are willing to pay (WTP) 
for a given quantity of the variety. It is important to note that each of the breeders faces a total 
demand for their product. The total demand is dependent on the availability and prices of other 
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varieties in the market. This demand curve determines that the wheat-breeding industry is 
monopolistically competitive. The supply curve is the sum of the TMC (middle right hand panel) 
and the FSS royalty (shown in the bottom right hand panel).  
Upper left hand panel: 
Given supply curve of FSS and the total demand for the new variety (i) (top right hand 
panel), the demand for certified seed can be derived as a derived residual demand (upper left 
hand panel). The price intercept of the derived residual demand for certified seed is at price of 
intersection of supply of FSS and total demand for variety (i).  
Middle left hand panel: 
This panel shows the price that seed services charge to produce certified seed. Seed 
production services are assumed to be competitively priced, meaning that this sector does not 
incur any profits and prices at P=MC. Further research needs to be conducted to analyze the 
competitiveness of this sector. 
Bottom left hand panel: 
The demand for certified seed faced by the breeder consists of the derived residual demand 
for certified seed (upper left hand panel) minus price charged by seed growers for certified seed 
services (middle right hand panel). The breeder facing this demand curve, sets the certified seed 
royalty. If breeders wish to maximize royalty revenue, they set MR=MC as the wheat-breeding 
industry is monopolistically competitive. MC of certified seed for breeders is zero, because once 
they have created a new variety, producing any additional output results in no additional costs. 
The intersection of MR=MC shows the optimal quantity of certified seed produced (shown in the 
left panels).   
Equilibrium Price and Quantity: 
Moving back up to the upper left hand panel, the intercept of the quantity demanded for 
certified seed and the derived residual demand curve shows the price (P) charged for the certified 
seed. Plotting this price in the upper right hand panel shows the quantity of FSS supplied and the 
total quantity demanded for variety (i) at the given price (P). The difference between total 
33 
 
quantity demanded and quantity of certified seed purchased is the quantity of FSS purchased 
(bottom right hand panel). 
Welfare Impacts: 
The top right panel shows the total surplus to farmers6 and downstream users using FSS 
(green triangle) and certified seed (i.e. farmers’ benefit from producing variety (i)). The benefit 
of using FSS is the area above the price of certified seed and below the total market demand 
curve for variety (i). The benefit from using certified seed is the green triangle above the supply 
curve and below the price for certified seed charged, as farmers reproduce their own FSS.  
The bottom right panel shows the royalty revenue for the FSS use of variety (i) to breeders 
(yellow rectangle). The bottom left panel (yellow rectangle) labels the total royalty revenue 
breeders get from the sale of certified seed, which is labeled as a surplus7. 
The middle left panel shows the price of certified seed charged by the seed growers, net of 
the royalty charge paid to breeders. Because seed growers are assumed to be competitive in this 
model, they do not receive any profits.  
It is important to note wheat-breeding companies have some degree of market power and 
may keep some of the benefit as profits. If their surplus is not invested back into research, it 
might not lead to a large productivity growth. This scenario is what is happening in the UK (see 
chapter 5). 
                                                
6 The surplus to farmers also includes the economic surplus to consumers and all other 
downstream market participants.  
7 Breeders face fixed costs (FC) of maintaining a variety once it is registered, such quality 
maintenance. Zero approximates the marginal cost (MC) of wheat breeders. 
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Figure 3.2: Market for Certified and Farm Saved Seed 
Source: author. 
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3.4.1.1 Application: Increase in the FSS Royalty 
The higher FSS royalty is set; the higher certified seed royalty can be set. Figure 3.3 shows 
the impact of an increase in the royalty charged on FSS.  
Bottom right hand panel: 
The increase of the FSS royalty leads to an increase of the certified seed royalty (bottom left 
hand panel) and the demand for certified seed (shifts upward). Hence, certified seed breeders like 
a higher FSS royalty. The revenue of the FSS royalty is decreased for the breeder due to less 
farmers choosing to produce FSS (however, this depends on the elasticity of demand)8, whereas, 
revenue for the certified seed is increased. 
Middle right hand panel: 
The cost of production for FSS for the farmer remains unchanged. 
Upper right hand panel: 
The supply curve for FSS shifts up because the royalty cost for FSS has increased. The 
supply curve is the sum of the TMC plus the royalty cost of FSS. Because the total demand for 
the variety stays the same, the intercept of supply and demand has increased, leading to a higher 
WTP for certified seed. 
Upper left hand panel: 
The demand curve for certified seed has increased because the WTP for certified has 
increased since FSS has become more expensive. 
Middle left hand panel: 
The seed producers charge the same price as previously because they are competitive. 
 
                                                
8 It is important to note that the elasticity of demand for wheat plays a role in these models. 
However, the countries analyzed are very small players on the world market and even if they 
would double their output, it would not change the price, so breeding efforts and productivity 
increases are important. The elasticity of demand in the world for wheat is very low, whereas, in 
the country itself, it is very elastic. An elastic demand means that farmers and breeders capture 
most of the benefits created by the national breeding programs.  
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Bottom left hand panel: 
The derived residual demand for certified seed facing the breeders has increased and so has 
the quantity for certified seed demanded, which decreases the quantity demanded for FSS (upper 
right hand panel). 
Equilibrium Price and Quantity: 
Royalties for certified seed and FSS have both increased so farmers are faced with a higher 
price (P) for both sources of seed. The supply curve for variety (i) has shifted up.  
Welfare Impacts: 
The top right panel shows the surplus of farmers and downstream users using FSS (green 
triangle), i.e. farmers’ benefit from producing variety (i), which has decreased compared to the 
scenario of a lower FSS royalty. The area is enclosed by the supply curve for FSS and the total 
market demand curve for variety (i). 
By charging a FSS royalty, farmers, however, benefit by way of the breeders, who get a 
higher benefit and have more funds available. If breeders reinvest this money for research, 
farmers benefit through increased variety yields and better qualities. If a FSS royalty is very low 
or non-existent (see chapter 7, Canada), breeder revenue is very limited. 
The bottom right hand panel shows the royalty revenue for breeders for the FSS sale of 
variety (i) (yellow rectangle), which has decreased dramatically compared to a lower FSS 
royalty, however again, this is very much dependent on the elasticity of demand for this variety 
itself and the demand elasticity for certified seed. The bottom left panel shows the royalty 
revenue for certified seed (yellow rectangle), which has increased.  
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Figure 3.3: Impact of a Change in FSS Royalty 
Source: author. 
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3.4.2 Complete Property Rights – Homogeneous Royalties for Certified and FSS 
The 1994 PBR Act in Australia allows the breeders to set a common EPR royalty for both 
certified and FSS. When FSS and certified seed have the same royalty, there is not a great 
incentive for farmers to wait a year for a specific variety. 
The Australian industry is a modified version of the model applicable to France and the UK. 
Australia is also different because once a royalty is set for a variety; it will never change (i.e. 
FSS and certified seed royalties are the same for the same variety) for the length of time of the 
PBR protection (20 years). Figure 3.4 shows the six-panel model for Australia.  
Middle left hand panel: 
The middle left hand panel shows the marginal cost (MCCS) of seed production faced by 
seed producers. It is linear because it is independent of the quantity produced as seed producers 
are assumed to be competitive.  
Middle right hand panel: 
The middle right hand panel shows the supply curve of FSS. The supply curve consists of 
the MC of the seed growers (MCCS) (middle left hand panel) and the MC of farmers to reproduce 
their own seed (MCFSS). As mentioned earlier, MCFSS is increasing to differentiate farmers. The 
kink in the supply curve is present because the MCCS is flat, and so MCFSS will not go higher than 
the MCCS. Farmers choose the cheaper expense. The opportunity cost of using FSS and 
foregoing the additional yield for a year is included and added to have a TMC of producing FSS. 
Upper right hand panel: 
The TMC curve and the royalty for FSS are added to get the total supply curve for the 
variety (i). This panel also shows the total demand for variety (i). The intersection of total 
demand and total supply show the total quantity of variety (i) produced. 
Upper left hand panel: 
The total demand minus the supply of FSS shows the derived residual demand for certified 
seed faced by the farmer. 
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Bottom left hand panel: 
This panel shows the derived residual demand for certified seed faced by the breeder, which 
consists of the total derived residual demand for certified seed minus the price charged by the 
seed producers. The royalties charged for certified seed are also shown here. Note the royalty for 
FSS is the same as for certified seed. The kink in the demand curve creates a discontinuous 
marginal revenue (MR) curve for royalties. The monopolistic competitive breeder sets the 
royalties at MR=MC=0, as shown in the bottom left hand panel. MC of producing additional 
certified seed of a new wheat variety is zero for breeders as explained earlier. 
Bottom right hand panel: 
This panel shows the total demand for FSS. It is kinked because farmers choose to purchase 
FSS up to the kink, as it is cheaper for these farmers (i.e. MCFSS is equal). After this point, 
farmers switch to certified seed. The total demand for the variety is shown in this panel as well.  
Welfare Impacts: 
The benefits for the breeders from certified seed sales are shown as the yellow rectangle in 
the bottom left hand panel enclosed by the horizontal aspect of the demand curve up to where the 
kink is located. The rectangle enclosed by the FSS royalty up to the kink in the bottom right hand 
panel depicts FSS sales. The benefits for farmers and downstream users are shown in the top 
right hand panel (green area) enclosed by the demand curve and above the supply curve. 
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Figure 3.4: Certified and FSS pricing 
Source: author. 
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3.5 Surplus Distributions of New Varity Adoption 
Given complete property rights, normal surpluses for consumers and producers occur. Often, 
however, intellectual property rights (IPRs) are lacking in strength or are incomplete, so research 
and development (R&D) activities within private firms generate benefits above the normal 
surpluses that are enjoyed by farmers and downstream consumers. This excess of social rate of 
return over the private rate of return is often described as a spillover (Jaffe, 1996). Because 
private firms make decisions based on their private rate of return, they often do not undertake 
research, which would be socially desirable (Jaffe, 1996).  
In this thesis, I compare the additional annual benefits created for farmers and breeders 
through innovation and varietal improvement. The benefits to breeders and farmers are 
calculated using the yield increases per year and world price. Depending on the royalty breeders 
charge for new varieties, I can identify what portion of the benefit created by the new varieties is 
captured by the breeders (private benefit) and which portion transfers to farmers and downstream 
users (social benefit) due to incomplete property rights. The benefit to breeders is the annual 
royalty revenue for the new variety, which is known. The benefit to farmers is the total additional 
benefit minus the benefit to the breeders. The total additional benefit is then divided by the total 
production to get a benefit of $/ton of production. Theory suggests that private benefits are 
higher, the stronger the IPRs are in each country. The benefit analysis in this study only 
considers royalty investment and revenue. It excludes any public and levy funding. Also, the 
benefits calculated are gross benefits. Farmers still have to consider additional costs of producing 
a new variety. 
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4 France 
France is the fourth largest producer and exporter of wheat in the world, surpassed only by 
China, India and the United States (US) in production (FAOSTAT, 2013). France produces about 
36 million tons of wheat per year in total, averaging 7.2 tons per hectare, which is high compared 
to other countries. Wheat is a major contributor to the French economy with a positive balance of 
trade of more than $5.52 billion (Wheat Initiative, 2013). Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of 
wheat grown compared to the next five large crops in France. It is apparent that wheat and sugar 
beet have the highest production output in tons. 
 
Figure 4.1: Production of Six Major Crops in France 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2013. 
France has 12 main private wheat-breeding firms that make up a very competitive seed 
market, namely Bayer CropScience, Biogemma, Limagrain Europe, RAGT Semences, 
Florimond-Desprez, Lemarie-Deffontaines, Secobra Recherches, Momont, Saaten Union, 
Syngenta, Caussade-Semences and Agri-Obtentions S.A. (Wheat Initiative, 2013). Private firms 
dominate wheat breeding in France. However, the Institut National de la Recherche 
Agronomique (INRA), which is a public institution, collaborates with universities and manages a 
breeding program in conjunction with its research programs through Agri-Obtentions (Wheat 
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Initiative, 2013). The two largest breeders, Limagrain and RAGT Semences, which combined 
make up 60-70 percent of the market, are cooperatives and are owned by farmers. Only about 30 
percent of the market share belongs to international companies such as Bayer or private family 
companies such as Momont. Cooperatives also control a large part of the seed production and all 
other services such as chemicals sales (Interview 1, 2012). Durum wheat, which represents only 
about ten percent of production and is grown mostly in southern France, has three main breeders: 
RAGT Semences, Florimond-Desprez and Limagrain.  
In France, winter bread wheat is known as ‘blé tendre’. Blé tendre is French and translates to 
the English word soft wheat; however, it cannot be mistaken for feed wheat, which in English is 
also called soft wheat. To avoid confusion, I refer to blé tendre as bread wheat. Given the 
importance of and high demand for bread wheat in France, this chapter focuses on bread wheat 
only. Most of the wheat breeding in France is done on winter bread wheat for three main reasons. 
First, wheat breeders can capture royalties on farm saved seed (FSS) on these varieties only;9 
second, the price of feed wheat is well below the price of bread wheat; and third, breeders are 
thus rarely breeding feed wheat anymore since the demand faced from farmers is very low 
(Interview 2, 2012).  
In this chapter, I begin with some background on France’s wheat-breeding industry and 
indicate which national and international regulations apply to the royalty structure for farmers 
and wheat breeders. In section 4.2, I briefly describe the history of France’s wheat-breeding 
industry and how it has developed the current royalty collection mechanism described in section 
4.3. In addition, I outline the major players involved in variety registration and royalty collection 
for France specifically. In subsection 4.3.3, I explain how France collects royalties on certified 
seed and on FSS. In subsection 4.4.1, I calculate the average additional annual benefit created 
through the introduction of new wheat varieties, and the proportion of the benefit going to 
farmers and breeders from the innovation. A brief summary concludes this chapter.  
                                                
9 Starting in the production year of 2014, royalty collection on FSS is not limited to bread wheat 
anymore; France expands the royalty collection mechanism to all crops. 
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4.1 Background 
Section 4.1 explains the regulations France has adopted to ensure royalty collection on FSS, 
focusing in particular on the legislation provided by the International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). In this section, I also explain how the French bread wheat 
sector is structured, how royalty rates are determined, how the revenue is collected, and 
ultimately how these plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) enable a viable private seed industry.  
4.1.1 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
Over the course of the past 45 years, France has taken steps to remain compliant with the 
UPOV convention. Historically, the pattern of compliance started as France joined the UPOV on 
October 3, 1971, to become compliant with the UPOV 1961 convention. On March 17, 1983, 
France passed legislation to become compliant with the UPOV 1978 convention (UPOV, 2005), 
and since May 27, 2012, France is compliant with UPOV 91 (UPOV, 2012).  
Under UPOV 78, farmers had the right to save seed to replant for subsequent crops and 
sellers of certified seed were obligated to collect royalties on the sale of varieties, which were 
then remitted to the variety owner, the breeder (Gray et al. 2013, p 17). In addition to UPOV, 
France is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and must also comply with the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Please see chapter 
2 for in-depth information on UPOV 61, 78, 91 and TRIPS.  
4.2 Historical Development of Wheat Royalty Collection 
In the past, farmers have always saved seeds from their harvest to sow in subsequent years. 
Until recently, however, only users of certified varieties took part in funding plant improvement 
research through royalties in France (UPOV, 2013). According to Société Coopérative d’Intérêt 
Agricole des Sélectionneurs Obtenteurs de Variétés Végétales (SICASOV), until 1993, farmers 
had the right to save seed “for reproduction on condition that plant breeders’ legitimate interests 
are safeguarded” (SICASOV, 2013). Since 1994, farmers were allowed to keep FSS for 
reproduction on their own land but are obliged to pay royalties on bread wheat. In 2001, the 
Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé (AGPB), the association of wheat producers and 
SICASOV, representing breeders, reached an agreement on vegetal variety enhancement for 
bread wheat, which opened up new prospects (France Agricole, 2007). This agreement has been 
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renewed twice since (SICASOV, 2013). This farmer-breeder agreement for a FSS royalty is only 
applied to bread wheat varieties and no other crops. After passing the 2012 PBRs Act, as France 
became compliant with UPOV 91 convention, all wheat varieties are subject to a FSS royalty 
starting in crop season 2014. 
4.3 Current Wheat Royalty Collection System 
According to SICASOV wheat breeding requires a long-term commitment. It takes more 
than ten years to certify and produce a new variety. Because it takes such a long time in addition 
to intensive capital investment, it was necessary to create a system that permits cereal production 
to become more attractive to wheat breeding companies. The bread wheat agreement between 
SICASOV and the farmers unions enabled France to achieve such a system (SICASOV, 2013). 
4.3.1 A Brief Overview of Varietal Registration 
It is compulsory to register wheat in France if it is sold on the market. IPRs for wheat can be 
garnered in two ways: (1) through national registration (Contribution Volontaire Obligatoire 
(CVO), known as Compulsory Voluntary Contribution in English) level by direct filing with the 
National Plant Variety office and (2) through the European Union (EU) Community Plant Variety 
Office (CPVO) (CVV level). The Plant Varieties Protection (PVP) Act defines PBRs legislation 
for France specifically through UPOV (PVP Gazette 33, 1983). The duration of registration for 
bread wheat lasts for 20 years in France, starting from the date on which the certificate was 
issued (Paritypatent, 2013). 
Once a breeder applies for registration, the variety is tested in the EU and is also checked for 
novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability (DUS), further described in chapter 2. Once it 
satisfies DUS requirements and shows Value of Cultivation and Use (VCU) it is registered in the 
official catalogue and becomes automatically transferred to the common catalogue at the EU 
level. VCU generates information to predict variety behavior nationally and abroad, and 
determines whether a variety can be grown economically (i.e. have some value in cultivation in 
use) (NIVAP, 2013).  
The cost of registering a new wheat variety in France is approximately $9,660, which is 
much cheaper than it is in the rest of Europe. Registration in Germany costs about $27,600 to 
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$41,400 per variety of wheat. The comparatively low cost in France incurs because the INRA is 
paying a portion of the salaries at the Technical Committee for Plant Breeding (CTPS). CTPS is 
an organization between INRA and the Chamber of Agriculture and is in charge to define 
registration criteria and long-term objectives for different groups of crops (Interview 3, 2012). 
4.3.2 Institutions Involved in Royalty Collection 
There are two main institutions involved in royalty regulation and collection in France, 
Groupement National Interprofessionnel des Semences et plants (GNIS) and SICASOV. 
Groupement National Interprofessionnel des Semences et plants (GNIS) 
Groupement National Interprofessionnel des Semences et plants (GNIS) is a national 
association representing plant breeders created in 1999 that has the responsibility of seed 
certification, verification, licensing growers and inspecting seed production in France. The 
Service Officiel de Contrôle et de Certification (SOC) is the official regulatory body within 
GNIS with the responsibility for official seed certification in France (ESCAA, 2013). GNIS is 
composed of representatives from all professions related to plant breeding, seed production, seed 
growth, seed distribution, farming and other interested parties. The propositions from GNIS are 
submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture for official approval (Genoplante (organization), 2010). 
Société Coopérative d’Intérêt Agricole des Sélectionneurs Obtenteurs de Variétés 
Végétales (SICASOV) 
Société Coopérative d’Intérêt Agricole des Sélectionneurs Obtenteurs de Variétés Végétales 
(SICASOV) is a cooperative owned by plant breeders, enforces IPRs and collects seed royalties 
(Gray et al. 2013, p. 17). SICASOV operates on a “declarative system” based on forms sent to 
seed growers. Each year seed growers apply to SICASOV for license agreements to grow 
certified seed indicating the variety and area of seed crops they wish to produce. Based on this 
information, SICASOV sends invoices to seed growers who declare the quantity of seed 
produced and remit royalties to SICASOV. SICASOV collects these seed royalties on behalf of 
breeders (ISF, 2012) and pays for this expense. SICASOV also sets the certified seed royalty 
rate. Seed growers have the incentive to accurately declare their seed production because GNIS 
is in charge of seed inspection and shares seed certification data with SICASOV, which makes it 
easy for SICASOV to detect any mis-declaration. 
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4.3.3 The Royalty Collection System 
In France, certified and FSS royalty rates and collection mechanisms are different. The 
different royalty rates and money flows are described below. 
Farm Saved Seed (CVO) Royalty Flow: 
The royalties on FSS are collected via end point royalty (EPR), known as Contribution 
Volontaire Obligatoire (CVO) in France, which is applied at the point of sale to all bread wheat 
varieties. The €0.50 ($0.69)10 per ton EPR applies to all bread wheat varieties and is collected 
through the seed marketers at the point where the farmers deliver their harvest.11 This CVO 
facilitates and reduces the cost of collection for GNIS and SICASOV (Alston et al. 2012, p. 32). 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the marketers charge the farmer the CVO at the time of the wheat 
delivery. GNIS is responsible for the collection of the FSS royalty from the marketers and then 
redistributes the money (1) back to farmers, which fall under the small farmer exemption 
(producing less than 92 tons per year), (2) back to breeders, in direct proportion of certified seed 
sales, and (3) forward the rest of the money to SICASOV. Breeders get reimbursed 85 percent of 
the FSS royalties and SICASOV forwards the remaining 15 percent to Fonds de Soutien a 
l’Obtention Végétale en blé tendre (FSOV), which is the French wheat research fund (Alston et 
al. 2012 p. 32).  Because both sources of royalties go back to breeders, 100 percent of the 
royalties collected were considered in the following calculations. 
Certified Seed Royalty Flow: 
Figure 4.2 also shows the money and information flow for certified seed. Breeders get paid a 
royalty from the sale of certified seed for their variety. The certified seed royalty rate is identical 
across all bread wheat varieties at €75 ($103.50) per ton, and is paid for when farmers purchase 
their seed from a seed grower (SICASOV, 2013). The seed growers declare certified seed sales 
and remit payment to SICASOV. SICASOV invoices and receives payment for declared certified 
seed sales, verifies the amount paid and reimburses the breeders. SICASOV and GNIS exchange 
information for verification purposes. GNIS inspects fields and seeds of seed growers. The CVO 
                                                
10 The exchange rate for Euros to USD is 1 to 1.38 as of April 15, 2014. 
11 The CVO is increased to €0.70 ($0.97) per ton starting in the growing season of 2014 
(SICASOV, 2013).  
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of €0.50 ($0.69) per ton is also charged to the farmers that use certified seed at the time of 
delivery to a marketer. However, as opposed to FSS, farmers that provide receipts of certified 
seed purchases receive a refund of €20 ($27.60)12 per ton of seed purchased, whereas FSS users 
do not get any refund at all.  
                                                
12 The refund is increased to €28 ($38.65) per ton of bought seed starting in the growing season 
of 2014 (SICASOV, 2013). 
49 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Certified and FSS Royalty and Information Flows 
Source: SICASOV, 2013 
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4.3.4 Efficiency of Royalty Collection 
According to the International Seed Federation (ISF), the French royalty collection system 
allows SICASOV to collect almost 100 percent of the royalties due on certified seed in addition 
to 90 percent of the FSS royalties (ISF, 2011). The other ten percent fall under the small farmers’ 
exemption or is consumed on the farm. The ISF grades the French royalty collection system at 
about 92 percent efficient on bread wheat (ISF, 2011). However, efficiency can be interpreted in 
different ways. The system efficiency is different if looked at the perspective of the breeder or 
the farmer. The bottom line is that the system is well enforced and most farmers pay the royalties 
due. A broader context of efficiency should consider the transfer of surplus from breeders to 
farmers due to incomplete property rights from the average additional benefit created of varietal 
improvement, which is addressed in section 4.4. 
4.3.5 Annual Royalty Revenue 
Approximately 50 percent of wheat seed in France is farm saved. The collection and 
contribution to breeders works as follows. On sales of 36 million tons, grain marketers remit 
$24.84 million in royalties to GNIS (Gray and Galushko, 2013 p. 16). The sector is funded from 
$41.4 million in certified seed royalties plus about $12.42 million in FSS royalties, $53.82 
million in total (Gray and Galushko, 2013, p. 13).  
4.4 Conceptual Framework 
To calculate the average additional annual benefit created through varietal improvement and 
its distribution, I am using the average yield increase per and the world price of wheat. The 
results are outlined in the following tables including the breeders’ benefits, and the transfer of 
surplus to the farmers due to incomplete property rights.  
4.4.1 Analysis: Additional Benefits from Varietal Improvement 
The average additional annual benefit from the introduction of a new wheat variety can be 
calculated, including the share of the benefits going to the breeders and to the farmers. Table 4.1 
shows the parameters for France. Note that the parameters are given on a per hectare basis and 
also per metric ton of seed, as different reader groups might be interested in different 
measurement units. These parameters are held constant throughout the calculations presented in 
the subsequent tables.  
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The certified seed royalty (row 6) in France is set at €75/ton ($103.50/ton) and the EPR for 
FSS, also known as the CVO (row 5) is set at €0.50/ton ($0.69/ton). The refund farmers receive 
(row 7) if they purchased certified seed royalty (i.e. they paid the royalty twice) is €20/ton 
($27.60/ton). To facilitate the understanding of the following tables, I calculated the total price of 
certified seed (row 8), which is the royalty for certified seed plus the EPR minus the refund. For 
further explanation on the royalty rates, please refer to subsection 4.3.3.   
Table 4.1: Parameters for France 
 
Sources: 1 www.uky.edu/Ag/Wheat/seedrate.html 
2,3 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT, 1961-2010 electronic database at faostat.fao.org, updated 7 
August 2012; and U.S. Department of Agriculture, World Agricultural Production 2011-2012 (Washington, DC: 
January 2013) 
4 International Grains Council (April 15, 2014) 
5,6,7 SICASOV, 2013 
 
Table 4.2 shows the annual gross revenue farmers receive from the average additional 
benefit created by the introduction of a new variety. The average additional annual benefit (row 
9) of $41.15/hectare (ha) or $255.10/ton of seed is calculated by multiplying the yield gain per 
year (row 3) with the world wheat price (row 4).  
By subtracting the royalty cost to the farmer (rows 10 and 11) from the additional benefit 
created (row 9) I get the additional annual gross innovation revenue for the farmer (row 12). 
According to this calculation, the farmer gets $30.06/ha or $186.35/ton of seed from the 
additional benefit created. 
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
1 Seeding rate (t) 0.1613 1.00
2 Average wheat yield (t) 7.20 44.64
3 Yield gain (t per year) 1.81% 0.13 0.81
4 World wheat price ($) 316.52$     
5 EPR CVO rate ($/t wheat sold) 0.69$        4.97$        30.80$       
6 Certified seed royalty ($) 16.69$      103.50$     
7 Refund for certified seed purchase ($) 4.45$        27.60$       
8 Net Cost of Certified Seed ($) 5+6-7 17.21$      106.70$     
Parameters for France
52 
 
Table 4.2: Revenue for French Farmers 
 
Source: author. 
Table 4.3 shows the gross additional revenue for the breeders and the administration costs (if 
applicable) associated with the introduction of a new variety. The additional income for the 
breeders (row 13) is the total royalty revenue of $11.09/ha or $68.75/ton of seed. Therefore, the 
cost to the farmer is the benefit to the breeders (rows 10 and 11). The breeders, however, get 15 
percent of the FSS royalties through FSOV, which is a research fund (row 14) and 85 percent 
directly from the FSS royalties (row 15). There is no administration cost in France. 
Table 4.3: Revenue for French Breeders  
 
Source: author. 
Table 4.4 shows the benefit distribution in percentages. Farmers get most of the benefit at 73 
percent (row 15). Breeders get 27 percent (row 16) and there are no administration costs (row 
17) being taken off the royalty income in France. 
Table 4.4: Benefit Distribution of the Innovation 
	  
Source: author. 
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
9 Gross Revenue from Innovation ($) 3*4 41.15$      255.10$     
Cost of Royalty ($) 
10 FSS 50% of 5 2.48$        15.40$       
11 Certified Seed 50% of 8 8.61$        53.35$       
12 Add. Innovation Revenue for Farmers ($) (9-10-11) 30.06$      186.35$     
Additional Annual Revenue for French Farmers
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
Income from Royalty ($)
10 FSS 50% of 5 2.48$        15.40$       
11 Certified Seed 50% of 8 8.61$        53.35$       
13 Total Royalty Revenue for Breeders ($) 11.09$      68.75$       
14 Amount through FSOV ($) 15% of 5 0.37$        2.31$        
15 FSS Revenue to Breeders ($) 85% of 5 2.11$        13.09$       
Additional Annual Revenue for French Breeders and Administration Costs
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
16 % Benefit to Farmer (12/9) 73% 73%
17 % Benefit to Breeder (13/9) 27% 27%
18 % Administration Cost 0% 0%
Benefit Distribution
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Interpretation: 
On average, farmers get 73 percent of the average additional benefit created from the new 
variety. Breeders only capture 27 percent of the additional benefit created. Farmers receive a 
large portion of the additional benefit created through innovation at no cost.  
Figure 4.3 shows the results attained in Table 4.4. It shows the additional annual benefit 
created in dollars per ton of production. It takes into consideration the average increase in 
quantity produced per year (650,000 tons), which is calculated by the total tons of soft wheat 
produced in France, times its average yield increase per year and the commodity price of wheat, 
set at $316.50/ton. Knowing that wheat breeders in France get about $53.82 million of royalties 
per year in total, representing about 27 percent, leaves the farmers with a benefit of 73 percent.  
 
Figure 4.3: Additional Annual Benefits for Farmers and Breeders in France 
Source: author. 
It is important to note these benefits are in addition to the normal benefits for farmers and 
breeders. These benefits are created through innovation and are calculated as return over variable 
cost. Farmers still need to consider additional costs, (increased cost of production due to an 
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increased yield, different seed costs, search costs, transportation and storage, riskiness, and 
agronomic differences) which they can pay for from this additional benefit. 
4.5 Graphical Analysis 
In France, farmers purchase about 50 percent FSS and 50 percent certified seed. Annual 
royalty revenues are outlined in subsection 4.3.5 and royalty rates are outlined in Table 4.1. 
Please see chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1 for further explanation of the model.  
The government determines the FSS royalty exogenously. Starting in year 2014, France is 
increasing their royalty rates for FSS as well as for certified seed. This increase leads to a higher 
supply curve for FSS and an increased derived residual demand for certified seed. This analysis 
is also outlined in chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1.1.   
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The French wheat royalty collection system works well and provides benefits for farmers 
and breeders. Farmers capture a higher share of the additional annual benefits created than 
breeders, which shows that breeders have fewer funds available for future investment in 
breeding. A higher FSS royalty rate can benefit breeders as that allows them to increase the 
certified seed royalty.   
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5 United Kingdom 
Wheat is the most important crop to the United Kingdom (UK) with crop breeders earning 
approximately $28.4 million per year in royalties (Galushko and Gray, 2013). About 65 percent 
of cropping land is sown to wheat, where the average UK wheat crop yields about 15 million 
tons in total or about 8 tons per hectare. The UK wheat production has tripled since the 1960s 
and according to the British Society of Plant Breeders (BSPB), 90 percent of the yield gain can 
be attributed to plant breeding (BSPB, 2011). Since 1990, yields have stagnated and production 
has leveled out (Galushko and Gray, 2013). National Association of British and Irish Millers 
(NABIM) Groups 1 and 2 hard wheat varieties make up 29 percent of total UK wheat production 
while the most grown varieties are soft milling types (Group 3). Production of high quality wheat 
is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the UK bread-making industry so additional high-
protein wheat is imported, mainly from Canada (Galushko and Gray, 2013). Figure 5.1 shows the 
proportion of wheat grown compared to the next five large crops in the UK. It is apparent that 
wheat and sugar beet have the highest production output in tons. 
 
Figure 5.1: Production of Six Major Crops in the UK 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2013 
Wheat breeding was predominantly publicly funded until 1987. In that year, the Plant 
Breeding Institute (PBI) in Cambridge was sold to Unilever, a private company, and that was the 
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end of public wheat breeding. Today, the leading wheat breeders in the UK are Limagrain UK 
Ltd., KWS US Ltd., RAGT UK Ltd., and Syngenta UK Ltd., holding the majority of the market 
share. There are also smaller private companies present, including DSV (Deutsche 
Saatveredelung AG) UK LTD., and Saaten Union UK Ltd. (Galushko and Gray, 2013).  
While the public sector no longer breeds commercial wheat varieties, public wheat research 
continues. Centers for public wheat research include two universities; the University of Bristol 
and the University of Nottingham, and two research institutes; the Rothamsted Research Limited 
and the John Innes Centre in Norwich (Galushko and Gray, 2013, p. 18). The current role of the 
public sector provides fundamental research that feeds into the private breeding programs 
(Galushko and Gray, 2013). 
In this section, I begin with the background to the UK’s wheat-breeding industry and 
indicate which national and international regulations apply to the royalty structure for farmers 
and wheat breeders. In section 5.2, I briefly discuss the history of the UK’s wheat-breeding 
industry and how they have developed their current royalty collection mechanism described in 
section 5.3. In addition, I outline the major players involved in variety registration and royalty 
collection for the UK specifically. Subsection 5.3.3, explains how the UK collects royalties on 
certified seed and on farm saved seed (FSS). Finally, in section 5.4, I calculate the average 
additional annual benefit created through the introduction of new wheat varieties, and the 
proportion of the benefit going to farmers and breeders from the innovation. A brief summary 
concludes the section.  
5.1 Background 
Section 5.1 explains the regulations the UK has adopted to ensure royalty collection on FSS, 
focusing in particular, on the legislation provided by the International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). In this section I also explain how the UK wheat sector is 
structured, how royalty rates are determined, how the revenue is collected, and ultimately how 
these plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) enable a viable private seed industry. 
5.1.1 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
The UK has kept up with current forms of PBRs, based on the principles of the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). In 1964, the UK passed the UK 
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Plant Variety and Seeds Act to become compliant with UPOV 1961. Since then, the UK has 
adapted its PBR to remain compliant with changing UPOV agreements and EU PBR legislation. 
In 1994, the EU passed legislation to become compliant with UPOV 91, allowing breeders to 
charge a royalty on FSS as long as it is “sensibly lower” than the royalty on certified seed 
(McKee, p. 10, 2003). The 1997 UK Plant Variety Act allows the UK to be compliant with 1994 
EU PBR legislation in addition to UPOV 91 (Galushko and Gray, 2013). In addition to UPOV, 
the UK has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995 and complies 
with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  
5.2 Historical Development of Wheat Royalty Collection 
In the past, farmers have always saved seeds from their harvest to sow in subsequent years. 
Privatization of public crop breeding in the UK was undertaken to increase total research 
investment. Looking at the UK wheat research today, some would think there was a smooth 
transition from public to private breeding; however, there were significant challenges in 
establishing the UK wheat-breeding system (Galushko and Gray, 2013). 
The Plant Breeding Institute (PBI) held a dominant position for over 75 years in UK wheat 
research and breeding and its wheat varieties still hold about 80 percent of market share. Gray 
and Galushko (2013) conducted interviews throughout the UK to get a greater understanding of 
its wheat-breeding system. During an interview conducted with a representative from a British 
wheat breeding company, a breeder said: “With the privatization of plant breeding in the UK, the 
development of elite lines went into the private sector, while a broad scale developing of pre-
breeding material almost stopped. Pre-breeding activities fell outside of what the private sector 
was willing to do as these activities are considered long-term, risky, and generally not yielding 
sufficient rewards” (Galushko and Gray, 2013 p. 27). “The goal of the pre-breeding program is 
to have public researchers involved in the development of novel germplasm that can then be 
introduced by the private breeders into their elite lines. Germplasm developed in the pre-
breeding program is publicly available and is free of IP” (Galushko and Gray, 2013 p. 28).  
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5.3 Current Wheat Royalty Collection System 
5.3.1 A brief Overview of Varietal Registration 
In order to market a variety within the UK or in the European Union (EU) in general, plant 
breeders have to register the variety through national testing systems either in the UK or within 
the EU. The UK breeders usually register the varieties through the UK system. In order to be 
sold as certified seed, a variety must be on the national list. To be eligible for the national list a 
variety must meet the usual criteria of distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability (DUS) outlined 
by UPOV. In the UK, the BSPB organizes the variety trials for the national list (Galushko and 
Gray, p. 30, 2013). Importantly, these variety trails are conducted cooperatively using private 
breeders. This allows the breeders to see how their varieties perform relative to the varieties of 
their competitors; it is an important conduit for knowledge sharing. Variety testing goes on for 
two years to ensure the variety has Value for Cultivation and Use (VCU). About 40 varieties are 
added to the national list per year. 
A second and very important step in commercializing a variety in the UK is achieving the 
recommended list of varieties.  The Home Grown Cereal Authority (HGCA), a producer funded 
organization, develops the recommended list. To be eligible for the recommended list, a variety 
must meet a number of merit criteria based on an extensive set of field and quality trials. The 
new variety has to have at least a two percent yield benefit compared to the current yield 
potential, or an additional attribute than already found in current available varieties (Galushko 
and Gray, 2013). Typically, less than 8-12 new varieties per year make the recommended list. 
Because the recommended list has additional merit criteria, producers rely heavily on the list for 
variety selection.  
5.3.2 Institutions Involved in Royalty Collection 
The two main institutions involved in royalty regulation and collection in the UK are the 
British Society of Plant Breeders (BSPB) and the National Institute of Agricultural Botany 
(NIAB). 
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British Society of Plant Breeders (BSPB) 
British Society of Plant Breeders (BSPB) Ltd., to which all plant breeders are members, 
plays a central role in royalty collection. The BSPB has four main roles; (1) organizing variety 
trials, (2) representing the UK plant breeding industry, (3) informing farmers the importance of 
wheat breeding, and (4) collecting royalties (Galushko and Gray, 2013). BSPB licenses the 
production and sale of certified seed and collects royalties on certified seed and FSS. BSPB also 
contacts farmers twice a year reminding them the importance of supporting plant breeding and 
paying royalties, since the royalty collection mainly relies on the goodwill of farmers (Galushko 
and Gray, 2013). BSPB is a not for profit organization, funded by a retention of the royalty it 
collects, memberships, and license fees. It represents 56 members from the public and private 
sector crop breeders in the UK (BSPB, 2011).  
National Institute of Agricultural Botany (NIAB) 
The National Institute of Agricultural Botany (NIAB) is an independent and not-for-profit 
plant research and information center that inspects and certifies every seed lot sold by merchants. 
Thanks to this registration, the seed lot can be tracked through the whole system. This allows 
BSPB to double check royalty collection because they receive a declaration from each seed 
merchant that specifies how many tons of each variety they have sold and the royalty owed 
(Galushko and Gray, 2013). 
5.3.3 The Royalty Collection System 
In the UK, the FSS royalty rate and its collection mechanism is different from the certified 
seed royalty rate. All the royalties on certified seed and FSS are collected through BSPB who 
retains about ten percent for its society and disperses the rest back to the breeders (Galushko and 
Gray, 2013). The different royalty rates and money flows are described below and are shown in 
Figure 5.2. 
Farm Saved Seed Royalty Flow: 
European and UK law oblige farmers to declare their use of FSS. The FSS collection system 
relies heavily on the honesty of those declaring their use of protected varieties to the BSPB. 
Neither the BSPB nor the breeder have right to audit or verify the declaration made by the farmer 
and therefore have to take it on trust (BSPB, 2011, p. 5).  
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The UK FSS royalty collection system is the most effective in Europe and generates vital 
income for plant breeders with generally good cooperation from farmers; however, there are 
some problems with enforcement. While compliance is generally very high, not all FSS is 
declared and paid for (BSPB, 2011).  
The EU and UK legislation provide three different ways in which FSS royalties can be 
collected. These are; (1) a contractual relationship between breeder and grower, or (2) an 
agreement between a breeders association and a farmers association (McKee, pp., 2003) or, if 
neither of the first two options can be agreed upon, (3) a default royalty rate on FSS of 52.5 
percent of the weighted average royalty rate on certified seed grown the year before (Galushko 
and Gray, 2013).  
The British Society of Plant Breeders (BSPB) and the National Farming Union (NFU) 
negotiated a contractual arrangement and set a uniform royalty rate on FSS, which currently is 
52.5 percent of the weighted average royalty rate on certified seed grown one year before 
(Galushko and Gray, 2013). 
About 80 percent of FSS royalties are collected through BSPB mobile seed processors. 
When seed processors invoice the farmer for seed cleaning and treatment, they also invoice them 
for the FSS royalty, which is forwarded to BSPB. The processors are paid a small collection fee 
for this service, which is about 6.7 percent of the total FSS royalties collected.  
Certified Seed Royalty Flow: 
The collection of certified seed royalty is an easy and transparent system in the UK. NIAB 
inspects and certifies every seed lot sold by seed growers. This allows BSPB to double check 
royalty collection because they receive a declaration from each seed grower, which specifies how 
many tons of each variety they have sold and royalty owed (Galushko and Gray, 2013). BSPB 
has about 160 sub-licenses with seed growers for production and sales that pay seed royalties to 
the BSPB. Seed growers are compensated about 1.2 percent on average from the total certified 
seed royalties collected for their collection efforts.  
Figure 5.2 shows the royalty and money (black) flows, information (green) and wheat 
delivery (orange) flows mentioned above. 
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Figure 5.2: Certified and FSS Royalty and Information Flows 
Source: BSPB, 2011 
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5.3.4 Efficiency of the System 
The UK royalty collection system operates effectively with little evasion by producers 
(Galushko and Gray, 2013). Similar to France, the royalty rate of FSS is the same across all 
varieties eliminating the incentive to mis-declare a variety. Some older varieties, however, are 
exempt from royalty fees so farmers declaring these varieties submit a grain sample in addition 
to the royalty exemption claim (Galushko and Gray, 2013). 
According to the ISF, the overall ability of breeders to collect royalties on certified seed is 
100 percent and approximately 90 percent on FSS. BSPB retains one to two percent of the 
royalties collected for the costs relating to certified seed collection and about 10 percent for FSS 
royalty collection costs. About one third of generated royalty income is re-invested into breeding 
programs. Compliance in wheat is very good at about 90 percent as compared to winter barley 
(47 percent) or winter beans (49 percent) (BSPB, 2011).  
5.3.5 Annual Royalty Revenue 
The annual royalty revenue in the UK is quite low, amounting to $28.4 million for the 
2010/2011-production year, which is about $1.67 per ton produced. This amount is a very small 
fraction of the benefits farmers receive from the new varieties. About $9 million is reinvested in 
to wheat breeding research each year (Galushko and Gray, 2013), the remaining $19.6 million 
likely accounted for profit. The royalty rate for FSS was £36.10/ton ($60.28/ton)13 of seed in 
2011, which is equivalent to £0.56/ton ($0.94/ton) of harvested grain. This implies that in 2010, 
the weighted average royalty was set competitively at about £68/ton ($113.56/ton) by the private 
sector (Galushko and Gray, 2013).  
Breeders have very little revenue from royalties to pay shareholders and to invest in 
breeding (BSPB, 2011). The main issue is the imposition of a ceiling on royalty levels as a 
component of the seed price. The private sector sees the 52.5 percent royalty for FSS as an 
element causing underinvestment in the system. It severely constrains what any firm can charge 
for seed royalty on a new variety. New seed varieties must be conservatively priced in order to 
capture some market share (Galushko and Gray, 2013, p. 16). About 50 to 65 percent of seed 
used in the UK is certified seed bought through seed merchants and 35 to 50 percent is FSS. The 
                                                
13 The exchange rate for British Pounds to USD was 1 to 1.67 as of April 15, 2014 
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first collection on FSS royalties in the UK was made in 1996. An increase in FSS use and a 
lower seeding rate have reduced royalties to the breeders. 
5.4 Conceptual Framework 
To calculate the average additional yearly benefit created through varietal improvement and 
its distribution, I am using the average yield increase per year and the world price of wheat. The 
results are outlined in the following tables including the breeders’ benefits, and the transfer of 
surplus to the farmers due to incomplete property rights.  
5.4.1 Analysis: Additional Benefits from Varietal Improvement 
The average additional annual benefit achieved from the introduction of a new wheat variety 
can be calculated, including the share of benefits going to the breeders and to the farmers. Table 
5.1 shows the parameters for the UK. Note the parameters are given on a per hectare basis and 
also per ton of seed, as different reader groups might be interested in different measurement 
units. These parameters are held constant throughout the calculations presented in the subsequent 
tables.  
The certified seed royalty (row 5) in the UK in 2010 was set at $113.44/ton and the FSS 
royalty (row 6) is set at 52.5 percent of last year’s average certified seed royalty rate. For further 
explanation on the royalty rates, please refer to subsection 5.3.5. 
Table 5.1: Parameters for UK 
 
Sources: 1 www.uky.edu/Ag/Wheat/seedrate.html 
2,3 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT, 1961-2010 electronic database at faostat.fao.org, updated 7 
August 2012; and U.S. Department of Agriculture, World Agricultural Production 2011-2012 (Washington, DC: 
January 2013) 
4 International Grains Council (April 15, 2014) 
5,6 Galushko and Gray, 2013 
 
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
1 Seeding rate (t) 0.1613 1.00
2 Average wheat yield (t) 8.00 49.60
3 Yield gain (t per year) 0.63% 0.05 0.31
4 World wheat price ($) 316.52$     
5 Certified seed royalty ($) 2010 avg. 18.30$      113.44$      
6 EPR CVO rate ($/t wheat sold) 52.5% of 5 9.61$        59.56$       
Parameters for the UK
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Table 5.2 shows the gross revenue farmers receive from the average additional annual 
benefit created by introducing a new variety. The additional benefit (row 7) of $15.83/ha or 
$98.12/ton of seed is calculated by multiplying the average yield gain per year (row 3) with the 
world wheat price (row 4).  
By subtracting the royalty cost to the farmer (rows 8 and 9) from the additional benefit 
created (row 7), there is the gross revenue for the farmer (row 10). The royalty cost is separated 
because farmers in the UK use, on average, 42.5 percent of FSS and 57.5 percent of certified 
seed in their production. The farmer gets $1.22/ha or $7.58/ton of seed from the additional 
benefit created. This is significantly different compared to France, where farmers get 
$186.35/ton. 
Table 5.2: Revenue for UK Farmers 
 
Source: author. 
Table 5.3 shows the additional revenue for the breeders and the administration costs 
associated with the introduction of a newly certified seed variety. The gross income for the 
breeders (row 11) is the royalty revenue of $14.60/ha or $90.54/ton of seed. The cost to the 
farmer is the benefit to the breeder (rows 8 and 9). The BSPB, however, gets ten percent of the 
total royalty income as administration cost (row 12) and processors receive 6.7 percent of the 
FSS royalties (row 13). The remaining additional benefit to the breeders is (row 14) $10.41/ha or 
$64.53/ton of seed. 
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
7 Gross Revenue from Innovation ($) 3*4 15.83$      98.12$       
Cost of Royalty ($) 
8 FSS ($) 42.5% of 6 4.08$        25.31$       
9 Certified Seed ($) 57.5% of 5 10.52$      65.23$       
10 Add. Innovation Revenue for farmers ($) (7-8-9) 1.22$        7.58$        
Additional Annual Revenue for UK Farmers
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Table 5.3: Revenue for UK Breeders and Administration Costs 
 
Source: author. 
Table 5.4 shows the benefit distribution in percentages. Farmers capture the smallest portion 
of the benefit, amounting to eight percent (row 15). Breeders capture 66 percent (row 16) and 
administration costs amount for 27 percent (row 17). 
Table 5.4: Benefit Distribution of the Innovation 
 
Source: author. 
Interpretation 
Farmers receive about eight percent of the additional benefit created by introducing a new 
wheat variety. Breeders receive 66 percent of the benefit, which is a significantly larger portion.  
Figure 5.3 shows the results attained in Table 5.4. The figure illustrates the average 
additional benefit created in dollars per ton and its distribution amongst farmers and breeders and 
the portion going to administration due to collection costs. 
It takes into consideration the increase in quantity produced per year (94,500 tons), which is 
calculated by the total tons of wheat production per year times the average yield increase per 
year times the commodity price of wheat, set at $316.50/ton. Breeders get about $28.4 million in 
royalties per year in total, which leaves farmers with only eight percent of the benefit. 
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
Income of Royalty ($)
8 FSS ($) 42.5% of 6 4.08$        25.31$       
9 Certified Seed ($) 57.5% of 5 10.52$      65.23$       
11 Gross Income for Breeders ($) 14.60$      90.54$       
12 Amount to BSPB ($) 10% (8+9) 1.46$        9.05$        
13 Amount to processors ($) 6.7% of 8 2.74$        16.96$       
14 Total Royalty Revenue for Breeder ($) (11-12-13) 10.41$      64.53$       
Additional Annual Revenue for UK Breeders and Administration Costs
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
10 % Benefit to Farmer (10/7) 8% 8%
14 % Benefit to Breeder (14/7) 66% 66%
12+13 % Administration Cost (12+13)/07 27% 27%
Benefit Distribution
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Figure 5.3: Additional Annual Benefits for Farmers and Breeders in the UK 
Source: author. 
It is important to note that these benefits are an addition to the normal benefits for farmers 
and breeders. These benefits are created through innovation and are calculated as return over 
variable cost. Farmers still need to consider additional costs (increased cost of production due to 
an increased yield, different seed costs, search costs, transportation and storage, riskiness, and 
agronomic differences) for which they can pay from this additional benefit. 
5.5 Graphical Analysis 
In the UK, farmers purchase about 35-50 percent FSS and 50-65 percent certified seed. 
Annual royalty revenues are outlined in subsection 5.3.5 and royalty rates are outlined in Table 
5.1.  
5.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The UK wheat breeding industry creates only a small increase in benefits per year. Breeders 
also capture the largest share of benefits. All wheat-breeding companies in the UK are private 
and reinvest only about a third of the royalty income, which could explain the slow yield gain per 
year. Farmers are left with eight percent benefit from the royalty. This is significantly lower than 
what is achieved in France. 	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6 Australia 
Wheat is the second biggest crop grown in Australia. The country produces about 25 million 
tons of bread wheat and 0.8 million tons of durum wheat annually (Wheat Initiative, 2012). 
Australia is a consistent supplier of quality and high-protein wheat (Dixon et al., 2009). Other 
crops grown include barley, sorghum, rapeseed, oats and cottonseed. Figure 6.1 shows the 
proportion of wheat grown compared to the next five large crops in Australia. It is apparent that 
wheat and sugar cane have the highest production output in tons. 
 
Figure 6.1: Production of 6 Major Crops in Australia 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2013. 
Public breeding programs such as those carried out by state governments, grower groups, 
and universities have been replaced by fewer and larger privately owned, or public private 
partnership (P3) companies (ISF, 2011, p. 11).  
The Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC) is one of the world’s leading 
grains research organizations, which is responsible to overseeing R&D to deliver improvements 
in production and profitability in the Australian grains industry (GRDC, 2014). In 1999, the 
GRDC announced it would discontinue funding wheat breeding. This was when Australia tried 
to re-focus and re-position their wheat-breeding efforts in a competitive global economy. The 
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main goal of this initiative was to attract private investment through the end point royalty (EPR) 
system (AGT, 2014). GRDC created three for-profit private wheat-breeding organizations 
instead in which it holds a minor share ownership. These companies are Australian Grain 
Technologies (AGT) Pty Ltd, InterGrain Pty Ltd and HRZ Wheats; which are public-producer-
private partnerships (4P) (Alston and Gray, 2013). The major private wheat breeders in Australia 
are: Australian Grain Technologies, InterGrain, Longreach plant breeders, HRZ Wheats, Bayer 
CropScience and PacSeeds. All major research organizations involved in wheat research are 
members of the Australian Winter Cereals Pre-Breeding Alliance (AWCPA)  (Wheat Initiative, 
2012). Durum is mainly publically bred through the department of Primary Industries and the 
University of Adelaide. 
This section, starts with some background on Australia’s wheat-breeding industry and 
indicate which national and international regulations apply to the royalty structure for farmers 
and wheat breeders. In section 6.2, I briefly describe the history of Australia’s wheat-breeding 
industry and how it has developed the current royalty collection mechanism described in section 
6.3. In addition, I outline the major players involved in variety registration and royalty collection 
for Australia specifically. In subsection 6.3.2, I explain how Australia collects royalties on 
certified seed and on farm saved seed (FSS). Finally, in section 6.4, I calculate the average 
additional annual benefit created through the introduction of new wheat varieties, and the 
proportion of the benefit going to farmers and breeders from the innovation. A brief summary 
concludes the section.  
6.1 Background 
Section 6.1 explains the regulations Australia has adopted to ensure royalty collection on 
FSS, focusing, in particular, on the legislation provided by the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). In this section I also explain how the Australian 
wheat sector is structured, how royalty rates are determined, how the revenue is collected, and 
ultimately how these plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) enable a viable private seed industry.  
6.1.1 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
The rights of plant breeders in Australia have been legally protected since 1987. PBRs are 
aligned with UPOV. UPOV was first established under the Plant Variety Rights Act 1987 
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(PVRA). PBRs in Australia led to more innovation, as private companies are assured that their 
investment in research is protected (IP Australia, 2014). To conform with UPOV 91, the 
Australian Parliament passed new legislation, the Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994 (IP Australia, 
2014).  
Australia makes use of the plant breeders’ rights (PBR). In 1994, there was a change to 
Australian implementation of the legislation, which allowed owners to apply an end point royalty 
(EPR) to grain produced from nominated PBR-protected varieties in order to collect revenue for 
further research. The duration of protection for wheat is 20 years from the date of issue of the 
certificate as required by UPOV 91 (GRDC, 2011). In addition to UPOV, Australia is also a 
member of the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property, the Patent Co-operation 
Treaty (PCT) and the Budapest Treaty (Paritypatent, 2013). Australia is also a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and must so comply with the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  
6.2 Historical Development of Wheat Royalty Collection 
Over the past 25 years, Australia switched from a predominantly publicly funded and 
managed system with free wheat varieties to a levy-based system and more recently, to a 
predominantly royalty-based funding system (Alston and Gray, 2013). This transformation has 
increased total funding for wheat and has changed the distribution of cost and benefits between 
farmers, consumers, and the private industry. Australia has undergone three major changes in the 
past which are: (1) the creation of the Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC) 
and levy-based grain research funding; (2) the PBRs Act and the creation of EPRs; and (3) the 
development of three for-profit public corporations that undertake wheat-breeding research 
(Alston and Gray, 2013). In addition to GRDC, there are several federal agencies, state 
governments and private institutions that fund different aspects of agricultural research (Alston 
and Gray, 2013).  
Since 2010, EPRs allow the wheat-breeding industry to get a high return on investment. 
Wheat varieties created before 1994 were free of an EPR and breeders introducing new wheat 
varieties having an EPR had to take this into consideration. The new varieties had to compete 
with the existing varieties, so new wheat varieties had to show significant benefit to farmers for 
them to adopt these (Alston and Gray 2013). It took a while for EPRs to generate benefits for 
70 
 
breeders because an enforceable system of levy collection had to be developed. This task 
included developing new licensing agreements, collection agreements, and educating the 
industry. To date, Seedvise Pty Ltd. acts as the single agent to negotiate and coordinate the EPR 
collection system. The PBR system was implemented to enable ongoing investment in plant 
breeding.  
6.3 Current Wheat Royalty Collection System 
Australia’s royalty collection system is a very transparent and efficient system compared to 
many other countries. Due to the implementation of an EPR, it is almost impossible for farmers 
to avoid paying a royalty on FSS or certified seed. In addition to royalties, the wheat breeding 
industry is also partially funded through levies. 
End Point Royalties (EPRs) 
In the EPR system, royalties are collected at the point of sale of the harvested product, rather 
than the seed. EPRs differ from seed royalties in at least four ways: (1) the breeder is able to 
collect a royalty even if the farmer used FSS or does not buy new genetic material (Perrin and 
Fuliginiti, 2008); (2) the breeder and farmer share the production risk. Because farmers pay 
EPRs at the delivery point rather than seed royalties, the better a variety is (i.e. the higher it 
yields) the higher the royalty payment is because the EPR is linked to the production level; (3) 
by eliminating a seed royalty (i.e. charging an EPR) the farmer is encouraged to use the best 
variety and seeding rate. When FSS and certified seed royalties are not the same, farmers might 
choose to wait a year for a good variety and save the cost of the difference between the certified 
and the FSS royalty; and (4) breeders can rely on crop marketers to enforce the collection of 
royalties (Alston and Gray, 2013).  
In Australia, EPR rates tend to increase over time. Most royalty rates for wheat are around 
$1.50/ton (Coles, 2007), however, they are set by the variety owner, considering research and 
development costs in addition to market forces and the value of the variety to Australian farmers 
(GRDC, 2011). Today some royalty rates are as high as $3.50/ton. 
Figure 6.2 shows how EPRs have evolved since 1994. EPRs have been increasing 
constantly, even though it took a few years for the new varieties to be adopted, as the older 
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varieties are exempt from a royalty rate. The EPR for each variety in Figure 6.2 are given in 
Australian Dollars (AUD).  
 
Figure 6.2: Average EPR Rates (AUD/ton) for Wheat Varieties by Year of Release 
Source: Alston et al. 2012 p. 29. 
The first EPR variety was released into the Australian market in 1996. Today, there are more 
than 180 EPR varieties in the Australian market (including cereals and pulses) (Variety Central, 
2014). 
GRDC and Levies 
Statutory levy-funded Research and Development Corporations (RDCs) have a profound 
effect on the Australian agricultural research system. The GRDC is the largest RDC and is 
funded by a mandatory levy of 1.02 percent on the value of farm sales. The Australian 
government matches up to 0.5 percent of the farm sale value (GRDC, 2011). Levies 
predominantly fund agronomy, crop management practices and pre-breeding activities that EPRs 
do not cover (GRDC, 2011). This levy is collected through the Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry (Variety Central, 2014). The GRDC manages levies and government 
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funds (Coles, 2007). The government support helps to compensate for spillover benefits beyond 
the levy-paying industry and reduces the tendency to set the levies too low (Alston et al. p. vi, 
2012).  
6.3.1 Institutions Involved in Royalty Collection 
Seedvise Pty Ltd is responsible for the EPR deduction and collection. GRDC plays a major 
role in levy-collection, which is another important funding tool in Australia.  
SeedVise Pty Ltd 
Seedvise Pty Ltd (Seedvise) has been appointed as EPR agent for a number of royalty 
managers. Seedvise negotiates and coordinates the EPR collection system (Alston et al. p. 24, 
2012) and Grain Trade Australia (GTA) supports this approach. Many major grain buyers in 
Australia entered contracts with Seedvise and agreed to automatically deduct the required EPR 
from the farmer’s grain payment on behalf of Seedvise. The grain buyers are paid a small 
collection fee for this service (Grain Trade Australia, 2014). 
6.3.2 The Royalty Collection System 
Australia differs markedly from other countries in their royalty collection system. The 
federal and state governments funded plant breeding until 20 years ago (Coles, 2007). As 
mentioned earlier, Australia uses an EPR system as the primary source of funding for wheat 
breeding and to establish and enforce intellectual property rights (IPRs). EPRs can be highly 
effective in providing IPRs and are comparable to that provided by hybrids and patents (Alston 
et al., 2012).  
There are two collection methods used by the companies responsible for the EPR collection, 
which are known as royalty managers. The variety is declared at the delivery point after harvest. 
The royalty is either collected directly or breeders are notified of the quantity and variety sold 
through the grain buying companies (ISF, 2011). Not just grain sold, but harvest material used on 
farms for feed needs to be declared and paid for as well (GRDC, 2011). Grain traders 
participating in EPR collection are part of the EPR Steering Committee, which was developed in 
2007. Grain traders either deduct the royalty amount from the farmer’s grain payment and remit 
the royalty directly to the variety owner or make reports on grain purchases, which can be used 
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by the variety owner to invoice the farmers directly. This mechanism allows for a simple and 
efficient royalty collection mechanism (Variety Central, 2014). These collection methods are 
described below and shown in Figure 6.3: 
Automatic Deduction of EPRs by the Grain Traders Purchasing the Grain Directly 
from the Farmer: 
Most grain traders in Australia automatically deduct EPR from the farmers’ payment when 
the farmers sell their grain. The collection, however, is only possible when farmers declare the 
variety with supporting documents, since each variety has a different EPR. In this case, the grain 
trader remits the EPR payments to the royalty manager with a comprehensive report, identifying 
the grower, variety and quantity of grain purchased (GRDC, 2011).  
Royalty Managers Directly Invoice Growers for EPR Payments: 
This system is also shown in Figure 6.3 and applies to growers that decide to use their grain 
on the farm or sell it to companies that do not automatically deduct EPRs from the grain 
payments. The royalty managers invoice the farmers directly for outstanding EPRs. These 
farmers are identified via grain purchase data, which was submitted, under agreement from grain 
traders and from the information submitted by the farmers through the annual harvest declaration 
form (GRDC, 2011). On this form, farmers declare quantity of seed sown, quantity of harvest 
grain sold, used on farm, stored, retained for planting and name of company that purchased the 
grain (GRDC, 2011). 
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Figure 6.3: Certified and FSS Royalty and Information Flows 
Source: GRDC, 2011 
6.3.3 Efficiency of Royalty Collection 
Farmer compliance with the EPR system is vital for long-term productivity gains and the 
improvement of varietal quality. Non-compliance can lead to lower returns for plant breeders, 
resulting in fewer resources for research, less investment and thus results in less competition. 
Sources used by variety owners to enforce or monitor compliance include:  
75 
 
(1) Harvest declaration forms, which are filled out when farmers purchase a variety to which 
an EPR applies. This is usually completed before seeding. 
(2) Bulk handler reports, which show sales for a relevant variety. These can be used to 
invoice farmers if the EPR has not been automatically deducted. 
(3) Grain trader reports on grain purchases, which can also be used to invoice farmers if 
EPR was not deducted at point of delivery (Variety Central, 2014). 
6.3.4 Annual Royalty Revenue 
In 2011, Australia collected royalties on 29.5 million tons of wheat. Assuming the average 
EPR was AUD 3.00 per ton, this would amount to a total of AUD 90 million in royalty revenue 
(Alston and Gray, 2013) per year. The use of certified seed in Australia is small with 5 percent, 
whereas, 95 percent is FSS. Farmers seem to only buy certified seed to change variety (ISF, 
2011, p. 11). In addition to the EPR, levies contribute a significant amount to Australia’s wheat 
funding. Levy income averages about $92 (AUD100)14 million per year plus $46 (AUD50) 
million from government contributions. Royalties generate a maximum of $9.20 (AUD10) 
million per year in GRDC revenue (Alston and Gray, 2013).  
6.4 Conceptual Framework 
To calculate the average additional annual benefit created through varietal improvement and 
its distribution, I am using the average yield increase per year and the world price of wheat. The 
results are outlined in the following tables including the breeders’ benefits, and the transfer of 
surplus to the farmers due to incomplete property rights.  
6.4.1 Analysis: Additional Benefits from Varietal Improvement 
The average additional annual benefit from the introduction of a new wheat variety can be 
calculated, including the share of the benefits going to the breeders and to the farmers. Table 6.1 
shows the parameters for Australia. Note the parameters are given on a per hectare basis but also 
per ton of seed, as different reader groups might be interested in different measurement units. 
These parameters are held constant throughout the calculations presented in the subsequent 
tables.  
                                                
14 The exchange rate for AUD to USD used is 1 to 0.93 as of April 15, 2014. 
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The average royalty for a new variety (row 6) in Australia in 2010 was set at $2.74 per ton 
of harvest delivered and the FSS royalty (row 5) is an average of $2.51 per ton. For further 
explanation on the royalty rates, please refer to subsection 6.3.4. 
Table 6.1: Parameters for Australia 
 
Sources: 1 www.uky.edu/Ag/Wheat/seedrate.html 
2 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT, 1961-2010 electronic database at faostat.fao.org, updated 7 
August 2012; and U.S. Department of Agriculture, World Agricultural Production 2011-2012 (Washington, DC: 
January 2013) 
3 Department of Food and Agriculture, http://archive.agric.wa.gov.au/PC_915 
4 International Grains Council (April 15, 2014) 
5,6 Galushko and Gray, 2013 
Table 6.2 shows the average gross revenue farmers receive from the additional benefit 
created by introducing a new variety. The additional annual benefit (row 7) of $13.93/ha or 
$86.34/ton of seed is calculated by multiplying the yield gain per year (row 3) with the world 
wheat price (row 4).  
By subtracting the royalty cost to the farmer (rows 8 and 9) from the additional annual 
benefit (row 7), the additional gross revenue for the farmer is shown (row 10). The royalty cost is 
calculated by regarding the fact that farmers use 95 percent of FSS and five percent of certified 
seed in their production. The farmer gets a gross return of $5.85/ha or $36.26/ton of seed from 
the additional benefit created. 
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
1 Seeding rate (t) 0.1613 1.00
2 Average wheat yield (t) 2.15 13.33
3 Yield gain (t per year) 2.04% 0.04 0.27
4 World wheat price ($) 316.52$     
5 EPR CVO rate ($/t wheat sold) 2.51$        5.40$        33.47$       
6 Certified seed royalty ($) 2.74$        5.90$        36.57$       
Parameters for Australia
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Table 6.2: Revenue for Australian Farmers 
 
Source: author. 
Table 6.3 shows the gross revenue for the breeders and the administration costs associated 
with the introduction of a new variety. The additional gross income for the breeders (row 11) is 
the royalty revenue of $8.08/ha or $50.08/ton of seed; therefore, the cost to the farmer is the 
benefit to the breeder (rows 8 and 9). The estimated amount going to royalty managers for 
collecting EPRs on behalf of breeding companies (row 12) is deducted from the gross breeder 
revenue, leaving breeders with an additional annual income of $6.69/ha or $41.45/ton of seed. 
Table 6.3: Revenue for Australian Breeders and Administration Costs 
 
Source: author. 
Table 6.4 shows the benefit distribution in percentages. Farmers capture 42 percent (row 15) 
and breeders capture 48 percent (row 16). Administration fees account for an estimated 10 
percent of the additional benefit created benefit. 
Table 6.4: Benefit Distribution of the Innovation 
 
Source: author. 
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
7 Gross Revenue from Innovation ($) 3*4 13.93$      86.34$       
Cost of Royalty ($) 
8 FSS ($) 95% of 5 5.13$        31.80$       
9 Certified Seed ($) 5% of 6 2.95$        18.28$       
10 Add. Innovation Revenue for Farmers ($) (7-8-9) 5.85$        36.26$       
Additional Annual Revenue for Australian Farmers
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
Income of Royalty ($)
8 FSS ($) 95% of 5 5.13$        31.80$       
9 Certified Seed ($) 5% of 6 2.95$        18.28$       
11 Gross Income for Breeders ($) 8+9 8.08$        50.08$       
12 Amount to Seedvise ($) 1.39$        8.63$         
13 Total Royalty Revenue for Breeder ($) (11-12) 6.69$        41.45$       
Additional Annual Revenue for Australian Breeders and Administration Costs
Number Description Calculation Per ha Per t of Seed
14 % Benefit to Farmer (10/7) 42% 42%
15 % Benefit to Breeder (13/7) 48% 48%
16 % Administration Cost (12/7) 10% 10%
Benefit Distribution
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Interpretation  
By using the current royalty rates in Australia, breeders receive 45 percent of the additional 
benefit created and farmers receive 42 percent. Farmers receive a large portion of the additional 
benefit created through innovation at no cost. Figure 6.4 shows the benefit distribution amongst 
farmers, breeders, and administration costs. It shows the additional benefit created in dollars per 
ton. It takes into consideration the increase in quantity produced per year (510,000 tons), which 
is calculated by the total tons of wheat produced per year times its average yield increase per 
year; times the commodity price of wheat, set at $316.50/ton. Breeders in Australia charge an 
average of $2.70 per ton in EPRs, which leaves breeders with a surplus of 48 percent after 
adjusting for external administrative expenses. 
 
Figure 6.4: Additional Annual Benefits for Farmers and Breeders in Australia 
Source: author. 
It is important to note that these benefits are in addition to the normal benefits for farmers 
and breeders. These benefits are created through innovation and are calculated as return over 
variable cost. Farmers still need to consider additional costs (increased cost of production due to 
an increased yield, different seed costs, search costs, transportation and storage, riskiness, and 
agronomic differences) for which they can pay for from this additional benefit.  
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Benefits for farmers and breeders are about the same, indicating that farmers still receive a 
large part of the additional benefit at no cost.  
6.5 Graphical Analysis 
In Australia, farmers use about 95 percent of FSS and purchase about 5 percent of certified 
seed. The Australian model differs from the United Kingdom (UK) and French model because 
the royalties on certified and FSS are identical, therefore, the pricing of FSS does not change 
demand for certified seed. However, pricing of a new variety plays a role in the demand for an 
older variety. The model for Australia is presented in chapter 3, specifically in subsection 3.4.2. 
6.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Australia has significantly increased its research funding through levies and EPRs. 
Australia’s example shows that a country can address underfunding problems through 
complementary public levy-based, private research funding and a government matching 
approach. The GRDC creation of the private wheat-breeding industry funded by EPR attracted 
multinational investment and expertise to Australia. Farmers and breeders receive about the same 
share of the additional benefit created.  	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7 Canada 
Wheat is a very important crop in western Canada making up the largest seeded acres and 
largest quantity of crop production, accounting for approximately 60 percent of total grain 
production. Canada is a major wheat producer on a global scale where production and export of 
wheat is a multi-billion dollar industry in western Canada (University of Saskatchewan, 2012). 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta produce 95 percent of Canadian wheat. In these provinces, 
winters are long and cold and the summers are short and hot with limited rainfall. The low 
precipitation restricts yields but allows for higher protein content (FAO, 2002).  
Canada is one of the largest wheat exporter of wheat and by far, the major exporter of hard 
durum wheat exporting about 3 million tons per year (48 percent of total world exports). 
Fluctuations in Canadian production can have an impact on the world supply and price of wheat 
(FAS, 2004). Annual production of wheat in Canada averages at about 30.6 million tons 
(Statistics Canada, 2013). Yield increased at a rate of 0.52 percent per year during the period of 
1960 to 2007 (Veeman and Gray, 2009), which is considerably lower compared to the United 
Kingdom (UK), France, and Australia. Canada Western Red Spring (CWRS) accounts for 80 
percent of total wheat production, followed by Canada Western Amber Durum (CWAD) (Dakers 
and Frechette, 1998). Figure 7.1 outlines Canadian wheat production during the period of 2000 
to 2011. 
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Figure 7.1: Major Crops Grown in Canada 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2013 
Several public-private partnerships exist between industry and most publically funded 
research institutions. Breeding is conducted nationally through Agriculture and Agri-Food 
Canada (AAFC), the largest national wheat researcher and breeder and provincially through 
universities, mainly through the Crop Development Centre (CDC) at the University of 
Saskatchewan, University of Alberta, University of Manitoba; the Field Crop Development 
Centre (FCDC), an Alberta government funded research center and the Western Feed Grain 
Development cooperative Ltd. (Wheat Initiative, 2013). To date, there is only a couple of private 
breeding institutions in Canada involved in wheat. Syngenta has had one wheat breeder in 
Manitoba for many years and has released one wheat variety over the past 30 years. Bayer 
CropScience entered wheat breeding in 2013 by establishing a wheat-breeding program near 
Saskatoon, SK.   
In this section, I begin with some background on Canada’s wheat-breeding industry and 
indicate which national and international regulations apply to the royalty structure for farmers 
and wheat breeders. In subsection 7.1.1, I briefly describe the history of Canada’s wheat-
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breeding industry and how it has developed to the current system described in subsection 7.1.3. 
In addition, I outline the variety registration procedure for Canada in subsection 7.1.2. 
7.1 Background 
In section 7.1 I focus on the legislation provided by the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) in Canada. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are 
important so that breeders can collect royalties to cover investment costs and ensure funding for 
future research. Canada, however, lacks a system of farm saved seed (FSS) royalty collection, 
simply because IPRs are not strong enough. 
7.1.1 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
Canada signed the UPOV 91 convention in 1992; however, the PBR legislation has not been 
amended to conform with UPOV 91 yet. This is likely to change in the near future as the 
government of Canada has introduced Bill C-18 to amend the Plants Breeders Right (PBRs) Act 
to become complaint with UPOV 91. Bill C-18 is expected to pass in the autumn of 2014. In 
addition to UPOV, Canada is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and must 
so comply with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). Currently, investment in wheat breeding is scarce because IP in plants cannot be 
properly protected through TRIPS since Canada does not allow patents in plants.  
7.1.2 A Brief Overview of Varietal Registration 
To be able to register a variety in Canada, it had to be “visually distinguishable” from other 
varieties. This requirement was removed in eastern Canada in 1989 and the production of new 
varieties has since increased (ISF, 2011). In Canada, the variety registration office (VRO) of the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) determines whether a new variety can be registered. 
Only varieties recommended by regional committees are registered (AAFC, 2012). The two 
regional committees in Canada are (1) the Prairie Grain Development Committee (PGDC) and 
(2) the Eastern Standards Committee (ESC). Any unregistered variety can only be sold for feed 
and cannot be sold on export markets. 
The variety registration system in Canada is governed by the Seeds Act and managed by the 
VRO and the CFIA, which has the regulatory authority (Harvey, 2014). The purpose of variety 
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registration is to (1) ensure the variety meets the international definition of a variety, (2) provides 
a reference seed sample, and (3) facilitates the National Seed Certification process (CFIA, 2012).  
7.1.3 The Canadian Royalty System 
In 2011, the Canadian Seed Trade Association (CSTA) estimated national certified seed use 
at 20 percent (ISF, 2011). Breeders in Canada do not have any legislative power to collect 
royalties on FSS, which is an issue given the high usage of FSS as compared to certified seed. 
About 80 percent of seed planted in Canada is FSS (ISF, 2011). Because FSS is free of royalties, 
farmers have very little incentive to purchase certified seed unless they want to switch varieties. 
If breeders could collect a royalty on FSS, they would likely be able to increase their funding 
dramatically and increase their investment in research.  
7.1.4 Efficiency of Royalty Collection 
Canadian breeders collect a very small amount of royalties on wheat every year, averaging 
about $7 million per year, mostly on public varieties (CDC, 2014). According to the International 
Seed Federation (ISF), the Canadian royalty collection system is rated at 20 percent efficiency 
(ISF, 2011). The term efficiency in the ISF report is used in the following way: 20 percent means 
that of all wheat that is grown, royalties are collected on only 20 percent of all the sales, which 
are the sales of certified seed. It assumes collection of FSS royalties with zero percent efficiency 
(i.e. no farmer pays a royalty) even though there is no legislative power to collect these royalties. 
Also, efficiency can be interpreted in different ways. The system efficiency is different if looked 
from the perspective of the breeder or the farmer. The ISF report does not comment on whether 
the royalties are optimal or too low, nor does it consider if royalties could be collected on FSS. 
As mentioned, a broader context of efficiency should consider the transfer of surpluses from 
breeders to farmers due to incomplete property rights from the additional benefits created 
through varietal improvement. 
Figure 7.2 shows the distributions between breeder and farmer from the additional annual 
benefit created through innovation. As mentioned earlier, Canada has an average production of 
30 million tons of wheat per year and has an average yield increase of 0.52 percent (Veeman and 
Gray, 2009).  
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Figure 7.2: Additional Annual Benefits for Farmers and Breeders in Canada 
Source: author. 
In 2013, wheat production increased 156,000 tons and yielded an additional economic 
benefit of $49,388,040 given a world price of $316.60/ton. Breeders get an estimated return of 
$7 million per year, which represents 14 percent of the total benefit. Farmers receive 86 percent 
respectively. 
7.2 Discussion and Conclusion 
Because Canada is still part of UPOV 78 and has not yet signed the UPOV 91 convention, 
there is no legal basis for breeders to implement a system for FSS royalty collection. This means 
that FSS is freely available to farmers; only 20 percent of production is using certified seed. 
Breeders can only collect royalties on certified seed and so have very limited revenue and cannot 
recover their investment costs. As seen in Figure 7.2, breeders capture a very small part of the 
additional benefit created. This is likely the reason for private underinvestment in wheat 
research. Canada has the potential to have a viable seed industry if proper legislation is in place 
to collect royalties on FSS, which can attract more investment, especially from the private sector. 
More investment in research is likely to lead to better varieties and higher revenue for both, 
farmers and breeders.  	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8 Summary and Conclusions 
The wheat-breeding systems in France, United Kingdom (UK), Australia and Canada vary 
significantly. They vary in many ways; implementation of their royalty collection mechanisms, 
their royalty rates, the number of private and public wheat-breeding firms and, most importantly, 
the additional annual benefit received by farmers and breeders from innovation. Figure 8.1 
shows the different countries and the additional annual benefits for breeders and farmers through 
the introduction of new wheat varieties. The measure is in $/ton of production. It is important to 
note, that only royalties invested in wheat breeding are used, not total investment. Publicly 
funded and levy funded wheat breeding is excluded from this analysis.  
 
Figure 8.1: Additional Annual Benefits for Farmers and Breeders - Country Comparison 
Source: author. 
Even though France and UK have similar royalty rates, they vary significantly in the total 
benefit created. French breeders create an additional annual benefit of approximately $5.71/ton 
of production, whereas, the UK breeders create an additional annual benefit of about $1.98/ton of 
production. Breeders in both countries realize roughly the same return per ton of production 
while farmers in France realize a much greater return in France. There is a clear Pareto-
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improvement from the UK system to the French system. In that sense, a shift in systems might be 
possible. The large difference in additional surplus is possibly due to annual yield gains in the 
UK are approximately one third of the annual yield gain in France and the different political 
economies in the two countries. The low yield gain in the UK (Gray and Galushko, 2013) 
possibly implies that research is less effective or that there is not enough research funding 
available. In the UK, the private wheat-breeding companies also retain a third of the royalty 
income as profit for shareholders, which also reduces private research funding. In the UK, there 
is also a share of the royalty income, which falls away for administrative costs as opposed to 
France where administration costs are not paid with royalty income. It is possible that France is 
more successful in innovation as two large cooperatives hold 60-70 percent of the wheat-
breeding market share. These cooperatives are owned by farmers and therefore may operate best 
interest of farmers.  
Australia creates the largest amount of additional benefit per year; creating approximately 
$6.48/ton of production, but farmers do not benefit as much as they do in France. Their plant 
breeders’ rights (PBRs) are implemented in a way that breeders can collect virtually all royalties 
due through an end point royalty (EPR) system. Australian royalties are smaller than compared 
to the UK and France; however, they are increasing over time and Australia already has higher 
total royalty revenue likely due to larger production of wheat. Wheat breeders have a larger 
amount of funding available for further breeding, however, it is not known if the companies 
reinvest all their income back to research. Some of the annual income is likely accounted for 
profit. Breeders in Australia capture a larger amount of the additional benefit created (part which 
falls away for administrative costs) compared to farmers; and compared to breeders in other 
countries. From the total royalties collected, about 10 percent falls away for administration costs 
for royalty collection. 
Canadian wheat breeders produce the least additional amount of benefit per year compared 
to France, UK, and Australia at $1.62/ton. In Canada, administration costs not paid with 
royalties, rather through other bodies and so is not included in the analysis. Because Canadian 
wheat breeders currently cannot collect royalties on farm saved seed (FSS), their additional 
revenue per year is very small and evidently not enough to attract private wheat breeders in 
Canada. In fact, as mentioned in chapter 7, only two percent of wheat breeding in Canada is 
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financed by the private sector. If the public wheat breeding programs continue the longer term 
trend of reducing their investment and no FSS royalties can be collected, the additional annual 
benefit in Canada has the potential to decrease in the future.  
Introducing the Australian system in France would be difficult as long as French farmers 
have political power. For Canada, both farmers and breeders should be willing to make a move 
to either the French or the Australian system. Depending on the relative power of the two groups, 
farmers or breeders determines which system is more likely. The benefits to farmers do not 
match the gains in yields – as the Australian case shows, while the higher yields generate more 
additional gross benefits, the farmer share falls. As well, the Australian case also has higher 
research and development (R&D) costs, meaning not all benefits go back into society as they 
might go back into research.  
According to findings in this thesis, there is a correlation between royalty income and value 
of yield gain per year. Canada has the lowest royalty income at $7 million and has a yield 
increase of about half a percent. The UK invests about $9 million per year and has slight yield 
gain benefit compared to Canada. However, France invests about $54 million and has an average 
yield increase of 1.8 percent. Australia has a royalty income of about $84 million. The amount 
reinvested into research is unknown, but Australia has the highest yield gain per year on average, 
slightly above two percent. The correlation between royalty income and value of yield gain per 
year could however also be due to many other factors but is consistent with theory. Further 
research needs to be conducted including public and levy investments in wheat breeding. 
Including these figures can lead to a different outcome. This study only considers the benefits 
created in each country given the royalty investment in research and does not consider costs 
associated with the increased yield gain. These findings lead to the following policy 
implications: 
Policy Implications 
The higher the FSS rate, the more breeders can charge for certified seed as shown in the 
model in chapter 3. This implies that Canada should implement a system to collect FSS royalties 
and decide on a FSS royalty that allows breeders to charge an adequate royalty for certified seed.  
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Depending on the objective Canada has for its future wheat-breeding industry (i.e. in favour 
of wheat breeders or farmers), royalties should be priced accordingly. France has low royalties 
that are more beneficial to the farmer, whereas, in the UK, royalties are higher and more 
favourable to breeders.  
In addition to royalties, it is important to look at public and private relationships. In France 
private and public collaborate with each other successfully. If the wheat breeding is left to 
private firms, it can lead to underinvestment, such as, in the UK or to a decreased benefit to 
farmers, such as, in Australia. 
Implementing UPOV 91 and including the farmers’ privilege can balance interests amongst 
farmers and breeders in addition to public and private groups (Parker, 2014). The new legislation 
can stimulate investment, enhance access to foreign varieties and facilitate the protection of 
Canadian varieties abroad, especially since now varieties can be sold beyond the national 
boundary (Parker, 2014). With the new legislation in place, breeders have the option to take legal 
action when a breach of contract occurs, license growers and redefine agreements; and most 
importantly, can create a mechanism to collect royalties on FSS (Parker, 2014). 
Benefits for farmers include having access to better varieties, higher diversity in varieties 
and, aiming towards international harmonization, can attract foreign breeders to Canada (Parker, 
2014). In addition, Canada has the opportunity to design and implement a royalty collection 
system, such as EPRs. 
The PBR approach is regarded as the most effective IP system for the protection of new 
varieties. An optimal and effective IP system needs to balance between protection and access 
(Dons, 2013). For PBR to be fully effective, all of the world’s countries need to be members of 
UPOV 91 or incorporate all provisions of UPOV 91 in their legislation (Dons, 2013). The 
updated breeders’ rights are needed to provide access to the best genetic resources (Dons, 2013). 
8.1 Lessons for Canada  
Looking at the history and current situations of France, UK, and Australia, Canada can learn 
the following lessons: 
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8.1.1 Lessons from France 
• France has a great working system with a mid-sized private wheat-breeding sector that has 
a long history of partnership. 
• France uses a fixed royalty rate, which is set by the industry and farmer unions together. 
This allows farmers and breeders to plan forward and know the future royalty rates. In 
addition, this reduces the risk of excessive increases in royalty rates.  
• GNIS and SICASOV have a successful working relationship, ensuring a good compliance 
in royalty collection. Collaboration between farmers’ and breeders’ unions and government 
is important in the creation of a royalty mechanism to ensure both parties can benefit from 
the new legislation.  
8.1.2 Lessons from Australia 
• EPRs provide a strong protection for new plant varieties, similar to the one provided by 
hybrids and patents. The EPR system is a mechanism to enforce intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), which over time can attract private investment for additional wheat breeding and 
research. 
• The Australian breeders generate the most revenue if compared with the France and UK. 
Private breeders set both certified and FSS royalties. 
• During the initial periods of establishing EPRs, the ability to charge a royalty was highly 
dependent on the availability of royalty free varieties in the market. The private wheat-
breeding industry took five years to implement but is profitable and successful today. 
• Australia implemented a private wheat-breeding industry successfully using EPRs. 
• In Australia, EPRs are variable and tend to increase over time, which can develop as a 
problem for farmers if firms gain market power and increase royalties dramatically. 
Currently, royalties are still low compared to France and UK, however they are increasing 
over time. It is too early to tell if this system will prove to be successful. 
8.1.3 Lessons from the UK 
• The UK wheat breeding industry is very small, consisting of 6 small private firms. 
Together they generate very little royalty, even though royalty rates are the highest 
compared to France and Australia. 
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• UK stopped public investment in wheat altogether. It is important to note, some public 
funding can be beneficial because the UK lost many years of research by switching from a 
completely public to a fully privatized industry. The public scientists stopped breeding 
after privatization and left the private industry on its own without transitioning period. This 
implies that if the public withdraws investment, it will not necessarily be replaced by 
private industry.  
• In the UK, there is also a potential of reduction of royalty rates over time, since the FSS 
royalty rate is a function of the weighted average of the historical certified seed royalty 
rate. 
• The report written by the International Seed Federation (ISF, 2012) rated UK and France as 
very highly efficient in royalty collection. The results gained in this thesis show, however, 
that UK is much less efficient in innovation than France. 
8.2 Conclusion 
UPOV 91, with farmers’ privilege, is essential to ensure collection of FSS royalties. With 
the implementation of UPOV 91, Canada has the legal right to draft a FSS royalty collection 
mechanism as found in other countries. By implementing UPOV 91, France, UK, and Australia 
have all increased private and total investment in wheat research and breeding and achieved 
major research gains. Similar results are expected for Canada. However, all three systems 
analyzed are still quite new and benefit distributions could change as the systems develop. 
France started collecting FSS royalties in 1994, whereas, the UK and Australia implemented 
royalty rate collection in 1996. 
Given the current results, a combination of public and private funding, in addition to levies, 
is likely to be the best result to achieve enough funding for a viable wheat-breeding industry. In 
France, public and private companies work well together. Future research can be conducted to 
analyze whether public-private-producer partnerships could lead to better innovation and wheat 
varieties. A combination of royalties, levy and government matching would likely be an 
optimum funding mechanism for future wheat breeding. Levies, which were successfully 
implemented in Australia on wheat, pose a great supplement to royalties and enhance total 
funding for R&D. Matching government grants to levies in Australia, also successfully increased 
total funding for wheat breeding and R&D.   
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